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RISK ANALYSIS IN GEOTECHNICAL
AND EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING
STATE-OF-THE-ART
AND PRACTICE FOR EMBANKMENT
DAMS
D.N.D. Hartford
British Columbia Hydro
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

ABSTRACT
Despite a proliferation of papers on quantitative risk analysis for dams during the past twenty years, risk analysis has not
found widespread application in dam safety practice. Recent experience suggests that, despite a great deal of enthusiasm in
the 1990’s, the professional opinion concerning the usefulness of risk analysis in dam safety practice is almost as divided now
as it was in the early 1980’s. This paper presents an account of the history and development of risk analysis ln dam safety
practice in the field of geotechnical earthquake engineering since its inception in the early 1960’s to September 2000.
Against this background, and with regard to the discussion of the State-of-the-Art/Practice, the paper describes the latest
attempts to quantify risk associated with earth dams for two failure modes, seismically induced liquefaction and a proposed
procedure for seismically induced non-liquefaction deformation failure. To overcome the difficulties in reporting a complete
risk analysis, the case study in Part II is presented in a way that will enable the profession to obtain an initial appreciation of
what is involved in quantified risk analysis for dams. Concerning the State-of-the-Art/Practice,
the paper presents
background to what are essentially proposed practices as there is as yet no broadly accepted standard of practice for
defensible analysis of risk associated with large dams.

PART I -EVOLUTION OF QUANTITATIVE
ANALYSIS IN DAM SAFETY PRACTICE

RISK

INTRODUCTION
The term “risk” implies some form of action in the face of
uncertainty; it is a term of universal significance with several
interpretations. Risk assessmentprovides a basis for making
decisions concerning the need for, and extent of, risk control
measures. Risk analysis is an integral part of the risk
assessmentprocess.
Recent improvements in understanding of what dam risk
assessment involves have revealed that the decision-making
process concerning the risk issue in question governs the form
and extent of the risk analysis method adopted. Therefore, any
discussion on the use of risk analysis to support dam safety
decisions and management must be carried out within the
context of the decision-making and management processes
that apply. These processes will generally be different from
one application to the next, 6om one owner to the next and
from one jurisdiction to the next, with the result that there is
no universal and concise approach to risk assessment.
This said, the methods used to analyse risk should follow the
same general engineering and scientific principles in all
jurisdictions recognising that the extent to which these
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principles are applied will be dependent on the risk assessment
processes that are adopted.
The discussion is set against a background where, despite a
burgeoning, but usually not independently peer-reviewed
literature on risk assessmentin dam safety practice, dam safety
regulators have remained generally silent. This poses a
significant obstacle to informed debate on risk analysis
because “technically well-informed” regulators are essential
participants in any debate concerning the role of risk analysis
in dam safety decision-making. The regulatory authorities
must ultimately be satisfied that the analysis methods are
appropriate for use in decision-making concerning matters of
public safety. The absence of stated regulatory positions
concerning the acceptability of risk analysis methods in dam
safety decision-making practice means that much of the debate
surrounding its potential uses are carried out in somewhat of
an intellectual vacuum and without societal consent which is
often representedby regulation.
This paper reflects the view that prior to discussion on
applications of risk analysis in dam safety practice, the dam
engineering profession should first develop an agreed
understanding of:
1. What risk is and in particular what dam risk is?
2. How risks posed by dams can be analysed?
3. What are the experience and qualification requirements
for participants in the risk analysis process?
4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of proposed
1

approaches?
What do the outputs of a risk analysis for a dam mean?
How can methods and results of risk analyses be
validated?
7. How can the results of a risk analysis be used in dam
safety decision-making?
8. What are the roles and responsibilities of all participants
in the overall process?
Addressing these issues does not impose conditions on risk
analysis that are any different than those imposed on other
methods of analysis used for important decision making
concerning matters of public safety.
5.
6.

In its most complete sense, risk analysis characterises the
uncertainty that is inherent in the answer to the question How
safe is the dam? Risk analysis does have other uses but these
are necessarily less than complete to the extent that different
forms of risk analysis can be applied to varying degrees across
an entire spectrum that ranges from an initial subjective sense
of the risk to a complete characterisation of the risk.
Therefore, it is important that the risk analysis identifies
precisely where it lies in this very broad spectrum. Further, it
is important to make a distinction between formal risk
assessment used to develop safety cases and safety reports for
licensing purposes, and informal risk assessments. The latter
have varying degrees of usefulness ranging from an initial
perception of what might be an appropriate course of action, to
detailed charactetisation of the risk to justify further risk
control measures. However, they fall short of being suitable to
reach a conclusion that the risks are being adequately
controlled. To date, all dam risk assessments have, by default,
been of the informal type as there are no regulatory structures
to complete the societal and licensing component of the
assessment anywhere in the world to my knowledge. Risk
analyses, especially quantitative risk analyses, which result in
actions to reduce dam risk may be quite different to those
required to reach agreement with a regulator that a dam is safe
enough. A risk analysis conducted to achieve the former
purpose may not be adequate for the latter. In general, a risk
analysis that is deemed appropriate for one application may be
deemed to be unsuitable for another application.
It is also important to recognise that risk analysis is not a
decision-making process in itself, but rather an integral part of
a risk assessment. Risk analysis and risk assessment add new
dimensions to dam safety decision-making as they involve,
amongst other things, explicit characterisation of the
uncertainty that pervades all aspects of dam safety decisionmaking as well as the complex concept of societal risk.
Societal risk is regulated by society as a whole through its
political processes and regulatory mechanisms. Typically,
societal risks are unevenly distributed, as are their attendant
benefits. The distribution of such major costs and benefits is a
classic function of Government, subject to public discussion
and debate (Health and Safety Executive (HSE), 1999).
Therefore, the notion of the dam engineering profession and/or
individual dam owners or agencies establishing so-called
‘tolerable criteria’ for societal risk, when viewed in this
context, becomes untenable.
At the outset, it is important to note that, with one or two
notable excedions including flood protection dykes in the
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This paper discusses the role of risk analysis in dam safety
decision-making and management from this broad perspective.
It is based on the experiences of a regulated owner, which has
formally embraced the concepts of risk management in dam
safety as a matter of corporate policy. Further, it is based on
almost ten years of experience in experimenting with the
various proposed approaches, subjecting them to critical
review, rejecting some and improving others, and ultimately
subjecting the most satisfactory approach to a simulated test of
(risk) regulatory acceptability.

TERMINOLOGY
Clear and consistent definition, interpretation and use of risk
management terms are essential. In this regard, the definitions
and interpretations presented in the Guide to Dam Risk
Management (Dam Safety Interest Group (DSIG), 1999) and
the draft ICOLD bulletin on Risk Assessment (International
Commission of Large Dams (ICOLD), 2000) are an important
step in this direction. The terminology and interpretations
used here are consistent with these documents. A useful
discussion on risk assessment terminology was prepared by
the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE, 1995) which
serves as an authoritative source. The following focuses on
the key definitions and interpretations
Risk: A measure of the probability and severity of an adverse
effect to life, health, property or the environment.
One
interpretation holds that risk may be estimated by the
mathematical expectation of the consequences of an adverse
event occurring (i.e. the product of the probability of
occurrence and the consequence) or, alternatively, by the
triplet of scenario, probability of occurrence and the
consequence.
Risk Assessment: whose essential features are illustrated in
Fig. I-l is central to dam risk management.
In risk
assessment, the results of the risk analysis and risk evaluation
processes are integrated and recommendations are made
concerning the need to reduce risk.
Risk Analysis: Risk analysis provides an understanding of the
nature and extent of the uncertainty concerning the conditions
under which the dam will be required to perform and the
uncertainty in the response of the dam to these conditions.
Risk analysis for dam safety is a structured process aimed at
identifying both the extent and likelihood of consequences
associated with dam or dam component failures (uncontrolled
Risk analysis processes, when
release of the reservoir).
applied by appropriately experienced and knowledgeable
individuals or groups, assist in revealing uncertainty in the
2
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Netherlands, risk assessment aimed at determining if a dam is
safe enough, is generally not being carried out. Further, and
despite the proliferation of papers on the subject of risk
analysis during the past ten years, there is no formal regulatory
acceptance of proposed risk analysis and risk assessment
methods. This can be attributed in part to the lack of an
appropriate regulatory framework to address the issue of risks
posed by dams. Therefore, opportunities to fully utilise risk
analysis in dam safety practice are limited at this time.
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fundamental performance characteristics of the dam and its
components. The process generates information about the risk
in the system and the contributors to that risk.
Risk analysis processes can assist in all aspects of dam safety

management that involve the collection of data and generation
of information and which lead to the conclusion (in the face of
uncertainty) that, given certain performance requirements are
met, the dam can be operated safely.
RISK
EVALUATION

RISK
ANALYSIS
Hazard identification
and definition

Safety

management
principles

Failur6 mode
identification
Range of failure
probabilities

Range of
consequences

ASSESSMENT

Risk estimation

Fig. I-1. Risk Assessment and its components - Risk Analysis and Risk Evaluation
Risk analysis for dam safety requires a multidisciplinary
approach as it covers areas of science, engineering and social
science expertise ranging from hazard analysis, dam response
analysis to consequence analysis involving consideration of
economics, sociology and psychology. Therefore, when used
as an input to the decision-making process, risk analysis may
not be solely a matter of engineering.
In principle, the process must be able to identify and analyse
all possible failure modes in the same way as forensic
engineering identifies the causes of failures and accidents.
Risk Evaluation: the process of understanding and judging the
significance of risk is fundamental to risk assessment and riskbased decision making. The principal role of risk evaluation
in risk assessment is the generation of decision guidance
against which the results of a risk analysis can be assessed.
The process of generating risk-based decision guidance
requires a statement of the owner’s safety management
principles, values and preferences as well as those of the
public, including consideration of the prevailing financial,
legal and regulatory conditions.
Definitive statements concerning the significance of a
particular risk require definition of the background against
which the significance of the risk is being described. In order
to do this, there must be a general understanding of all risks
within the system under consideration. In some cases the
system will be limited to the dam itself. In others, the system
could include local downstream, state wide, national and even
international elements.
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Risk evaluation involves policy analysis and policy
development and therefore is not an engineering discipline.
Engineers may be involved in risk evaluation to explain the
insights that risk analysis can reveal and how it might be best
interpreted. In this regard, engineering provides input to and
support for the policy-making activities that constitute risk
evaluation.
Whereas regulatory authorities may provide or rule on
tolerable risk levels, public acceptance will require good
communication and transparency of process. It may well be
that, as risk assessment becomes established on a firm
scientifically valid base, risk communication could become as
important as risk reduction in determining public tolerance of
risks posed by dams.

HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE

The following historical perspective is not intended to be a
complete chronological account of all stages of the evolution
of risk analysis in dam safety practice, but rather to focus on
the principal stages in the development of this branch of
engineering as applied to dams. The pre-1990’s material is
based on the literature and on discussions with some of the
key players who were involved in the various initiatives. The
1990’s account reflects my own first hand knowledge and
involvement. In presenting the account of the development of
risk analysis in dam safety in this way, I recognise that this
‘abridged history’ cannot also provide a view of the history of
3

the development of theories and models in the field of general
geotechnical earthquake engineering during the same period.
Origins - The 60’s. Consideration of risk is implicit in
engineering practice and techniques to control risks, based on
empirical evidence, have been absorbed into engineering
practice over the years. The first formal published treatment
of risk estimation can be traced back to Casagrande’s Terzaghi
lecture in 1964 (Casagrande, 1965). The significance of
Casagrande’s work, which is rarely quoted in contemporary
literature, should not be overlooked as it forms a cornerstone
of contemporary applications of risk analysis in geotechnical
engineering practice.
Casagrande’s contribution is remarkably insightful not just in
relation to risk analysis but also in relation to ignorance,
uncertainty and admitting to their extent in engineering
practice. Casagrande’s definition of ‘Calculated Risk’ goes
beyond what nowadays would be called risk analysis (the
process of estimating risk) to include risk assessment and risk
control. Casagrande observed that “the term ‘calculated risk’
is widely used in engineering, if not somewhat loosely; and
that usage and most suggested definitions have in common a
meaning that includes the following two distinct steps:
(a) The use of imper$ect knowledge, guided by judgement and
experience, to estimate the probable ranges of all
pertinent quantities that enter into the solution of a
problem.
(b) The decision on an appropriate margin of safety, or
degree of risk, taking into consideration economic factors
and the magnitude of losses that would result from
failure.
Casagrande outlined a philosophy by means of a fictitious
example, which if risk analysis is used in design and
construction (considerations (a) and (b) together) remains
valid to this day. Casagrande did not extend his philosophy to
the assessment of the risk associated with existing
geotechnical structures, but his description of consideration (a)
above provides a sound basis for extending his approach to
such an application.

subject can be considered to be the basis of subsequent
developments in risk analysis in geotechnical and earthquake
engineering practice - developments that were slow in coming.
Investigations - The 70’s. Subsequently in the 1970’s, there
were several attempts to perform risk analyses for
geotechnical structures, and theoretical approaches were
proposed. For dams, most investigations related to hydrologic
hazards and the use of economic risk analysis concepts in
sizing spillways, with little emphasis on the response of earth
dams to seismic loading.
It is not clear why seismic
considerations were not a significant part of the ‘risk debate’
for dams in the 1970’s, as Casagrande had clearly identified its
importance. It may be due to the historical good performance
of dams during earthquakes, as a review of the statistics of
dam failures and incidents reveals, despite the seismically
induced damage caused to the San Fernando Dams by the
earthquake in February 1971. It also may be due to the
complexities of the problem and the general ability to deal
with the problem analytically at that time.
Importantly, applications of economic risk analysis to dams
were restricted to situations where there was no threat to life, a
trend that continues today, although somewhat differently.
The issue of threat to life and its incorporation in economic
risk analysis for spillway adequacy was introduced in 1973
The idea of
and quickly dismissed by the profession.
assigning a monetary value to life was deemed unacceptable
by the profession at large with the result that risk analysis for
dams as proposed then, was not taken seriously.
The 1970’s and also the 1960’s provided significant advances
in the discipline
of ‘Prediction in Geotechnical Engineering’
(e.g. Lambe, 1973). Lambe classified predictions in terms of
three general types, before event, during event and after event,
with further subdivision of the latter two types depending on
whether or not the results are known at the time as, illustrated
in Table I-l.

Casagrande’s Terzaghi lecture prompted several written
responses, and probably many unwritten thoughts, several of
which remain relevant today. However, most of the debate
centred on experience and practical implications with little
discussion

of

the

underlying

philosophy

of

risk

analysis

(consideration (a) above). This does not detract from the
philosophical content of Casagrande’s contribution, rather that
the philosophical dimension requires expansion.
Interestingly, in his discussion on Casagrande’s Terzaghi
lecture, J. H. Stratton (Stratton, 1965) commented as follows:
“Experience and judgement come with maturity, but maturity
does not necessarily breed either. The pattern of thought
followed by the author [Casagrande] in resolving solutions to
the problems described in his examples represent an orderly
and analytical process - one far beyond the capabilities of
most in the profession. ”
Therefore, and despite differences in terminology and
application, Casagrande’s insightful treatment of this complex
Paper No. SOAP - 5

Table I-!. ClassiJication ofprediction

(after Lambe, 1973)

Lambe noted “the Profession is in great need of simple
techniques to make type A predictions. Even though type B
predictions might be helpful, they are normally not nearly as
Type C predictions are
useful as type A predictions.
autopsies. Our professional literature contains the results of
more type CI predictions than of any other type. Autopsies
can of course be very help@ in contributing to our
knowledge. However, one must be suspicious when an author
uses type Cl predictions to ‘prove ’ that any prediction
technique is correct. ” (Lambe, 1973). In his conclusions,
Lambe remarked, “We have many power@ tools for solving
dtJicult problems. Even so, I have become increasingly aware
4

of our limitations. There are many situations where we cannot
predict the performance of facilities with known reliability.
We need to continue our experimental and theoretical work to
improve our understanding of mechanisms and to generate
simple prediction techniques for the practising engineer ”
(Lambe, 1973).
The lack of emphasis on the investigative work of the 70’s in
this review does not detract from its importance in present day
applications of risk analysis concepts in geotechnical
earthquake engineering. The MIT Trial Embankment study
(Lambe, 1973, Hynes and Vamnarcke, 1976) illustrates the
challenge in predicting failure for static loading conditions for
geotechnical structures in terms of conditions which are close
to ‘controlled’.
The MIT Trial Embankment revealed the difficulties in
performing what can be considered to be amongst the most
straightforward applications of risk analysis alluded to in
Casagrande’s original work.
Clearly, if static loading
conditions present such analytical difficulties, dynamic
loading must present even greater challenges.
INITIAL

APPLICATIONS

- THE 80’S

Risk-Based Decision Analysis. The 1980’s saw a drive
towards more formalised risk-based decision analysis in dam
safety practice which incorporated benefit-cost analysis and
which included consideration of seismic issues. Application
of these economic risk analysis techniques began to receive
more detailed treatment in the literature in the early 1980’s.
The term ‘Risk-Based Decision Analysis’, which accurately
describes what they were, is the term that was used when riskbased concepts were applied in (limited) practice. Here, it is
important to note that what was termed a Risk Assessment in
Dam Safety Practice in the 1980’s (National Research
Council, 1983) is what would now be termed a risk estimate.
They were not risk analyses or risk assessments in terms of
currently accepted terminology, but they did represent first
steps in developing the risk analysis framework which
emerged in the 1990’s.
This Risk-Based Decision Analysis concept correctly
identified the basic components of a modern day risk analysis
as follows:
.
“Identification
of the events
or sequences
of events
that
can lead to dam failure and evaluation of their (relative)
likelihood of occurrence.
l
Identification of the potential modes offailure that might
resultfiom the adverse initiating events.
l
Evaluation of the likelihood that a particular mode of dam
failure will occur given a particular level of loading.
.
Determination of the consequences of failure for each
potential failure mode. ”
The methodology had an additional step to calculate the risk
cost, but this has not been presented here as risk cost is only
one representation of risk, and it was the representation of
choice for its intended application. The term (relative) is also
important as the approach was used for comparison of options
as opposed to deciding if a dam was safe enough.
Paper No. SOAP - 5

Whitman’s Proposed Approach. Whitman’s Terzaghi lecture
(Whitman, 1984), which provided the first insights into what
was to come in the 90’s, built on the original ideas proposed
by Casagrande almost twenty years earlier. The lecture
presented all of the elements of what is now known as
quantitative risk assessment for dams:
.
Probabilistic hazard analysis
.
Event tree based analysis of dam response
l
Consequence analysis, and
.
Risk evaluation criteria (based on suggestions by G.B.
Baecher).
Whitman’s
paper included
a number of important
observations, not the least of which is the fact that the overall
Whitman, recognised Casagrande’s
theory is complex.
concern that while “he [Casagrande] envisioned that it might
be possible to develop a subjective rating system for dams, he
worried whether there were enough experienced engineers
who could be expected to apply such a system in a reliable
manner”. In response to this concern, Whitman proposed “in
very preliminary form, a rating system cast in the format of a
risk to failure. This approach has two facets..
I.
2.

An event tree to give structure to the ratingprocess.
A set of criteria to guide choice of probabilities at each
branch of the event tree. ”

Whitman put forward this approach “not as the answer to the
very real problem of recognising the riskiness of various
dams, but to stimulatefurther discussion on the topic. ”
Whitman’s ideas did not fmd practical application in riskbased dam safety decision-making in the 1980’s. The use of
risk-based approaches relied on the US Bureau of
Reclamation’s (USBR) procedures as outlined in the
Guidelines to Decision Analysis (USBR, 1986). Event trees
remained extremely general in form with no detailed
of the failure mechanism.
Practical
decomposition
applications of risk-based analysis of dams in the 1980’s did
not adopt the ‘de-compositional’ approach to engineering
analysis referred to by Baecher et al. (1980) and for which
Whitman proposed an operational structure.
General Comments Concerning Risk Evaluation
was also insightful as it introduced the concept of engineered
structures being ‘safe enough’ which is now central to goal
setting types of risk regulation (Bacon, 1998). Whitman also
rightly observed that engineers should not be solely
responsible for the evaluation of societal risks from engineered
structures, rather that they should be participants in a societal
process. Time has shown the validity of this observation,
which was not heeded by all at the time or subsequently.
Whitman’s

Applications Of Risk-Based Concepts In Dam Safety. Riskbased procedures for prioritisation (McCann et al., 1983) also
emerged as did risk-benefit analyses for the construction of
new dams (Pate, 198 1).
The Tongue River Risk Assessment (PRC, 1986) was an
important development as it represented the first attempt to
present dam risk, for discussion purposes, to the Montana
The engineering analysis (risk analysis) was
legislature.
carried out using the USBR’s procedures, which were
5

described as “the only documented procedures at design
level. ” Probability estimation was in terms of a combination of
historical/empirical and judgmental approaches, although the
process for combining objective and subjective probabilities
was not described. The Tongue River Risk Assessment
captured the basic essence of a modem day risk assessment
without application of the detailed analysis and evaluation
procedures of the form suggested by Whitman (this did not
emerge until the 1990’s).
Interest appeared to be growing outside the water resources
industry with an application in the mining industry, presented
by Vick and Bromwell (1989). This case study provided a
description of how probabilistic risk analysis was used in
decision-making concerning the design of a dam on Karst in
Florida. The probability of failure was estimated using the
fault tree analysis technique and included an estimate of the
monetary consequences associated with loss-of-life. Typical
of risk-based analyses of the 1980’s, the results of the study
were used to inform the owner’s decision-making process. In
particular, the paper noted: “The geotechnical engineer need
not be intimidated by lack of expert knowledge or detailed
information in assigning probabilities that accurately rejlect
his or her engineering judgement, provided that the failure
scenario can be decomposed into tractable events amenable to
evaluation by experience and to investigation by sensitivity
analyses. ” This view appeared to suggest that the analytical
and de-compositional difficulties alluded to by Casagrande,
Whitman, Baecher et al., and others had been overcome.
Tolerable And UnacceDtable Risk In The 1980’s. During the
1980’s, publications on risk assessment of dams generally
avoided the issue of ‘acceptable’ or ‘tolerable’ risk criteria.
This does not mean that the need for some sort of decision
criterion was not recognised; it was. However, risk to life was
not formally addressed by dam safety regulatory authorities, as
it was generally felt that major dams whose failure would
result in loss-of-life should be capable of withstanding the
Maximum Credible Earthquake (MCE).
The ‘myth of
absolute safe@’ embodied in the concept of the Probable
Maximum Flood (PMF) introduced to assure the body politic
that the level of flood for which a dam is designed is
reasonable had and still has its seismic counterpart in the
MCE.
Outside the dams industry, the United Kingdom Health and
Safety Executive published “Tolerability of Risks Tom
Nuclear Power Stations” and an accompanying “Comments”
document (HSE, 1988). This presented regulatory recognition
of the notion of tolerable risk from hazardous facilities and the
formal description of risk evaluation criteria. The ALARP
principle, which forms the basis of consideration of what
constitutes ‘safe enough’, was stated in regulatory terms and
provided a framework within which risk analysis might be
carried out. The Tolerability of Risk Document provided the
basis for life safety criteria proposed for dams in the 1990’s.
The last part of the ‘pre-1990’s risk analysis historical jigsaw
puzzle’ was put in place when USBR published its Policies
and Procedures for Dam Safety ModiJication Decision-making
which defined a ‘Safe Dam ’ as “one which performs its
intended functions without imposing unacceptable risks to the
public by itspresence” (USBR, 1989).
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It later transpired that the view of tolerability of risk for dams
that prevailed at that time was overly simplistic, and that
regulatory involvement would be required to establish the
principles of Tolerability of Risk for dam safety.
Immessions
from Within
the ‘Dam Risk Analvsis
Communitv’.
Overall, a review of the 1980’s dam risk
literature could give the impression that risk-based dam safety
decision-making was well established. It appeared that the
principles of, and framework for, risk assessment, which had
been developed outside the dams industry, could now be
broadly applied to dams. The structure of the process was
well defined, and it required only modification for dam safety
purposes Bowles (1989).
Interest in risk-based decision
making for dams became so widespread that entire
conferences on Risk-Based Decision-Making
in Water
Resources, sponsored by the Engineering Foundation and
supported by several cosponsors were held. The introduction
to the proceedings of the fourth conference, held in 1989,
referred to the ‘growing popularity of risk-based decisionmaking “.
Thus, at the end of the 1980’s, while none of the numerous
initiatives in risk-based decision-making for dams addressed
the question Is the dam safe enough?, it appeared that all of
the components necessary to take this next step were in place,
at least in principle. In other words, if valid comparisons
between risk reduction measures could be made and relied on,
it was thought possible to compare the risk associated with any
individual option with some objective value of risk which
quantifies ‘safe enough’.
A Broader View - Impressions from the ‘Edge and Outside’.
One might reasonably conclude that conceptually, the
elements of risk analysis in dam safety assessment, including
seismic safety assessment had been identified.
However,
certain difficulties with the analytical detail remained. This
was nothing new. Concerns about the practicality of all
aspects of risk analysis had been raised since Casagrande first
introduced the concept of calculated risk, and many remain
today. Importantly, the enormous difficulties in determining
probabilities of dam failure through analysis were clearly
identified. Baecher et al. (1980) provide a useful account of
the difficulties as follows: ‘Engineering analysis is decompositional.
It proceeds by separating the engineering
design into the mechanisms offailure, analyzing or estimating
each component of the failure mechanism in isolation, and
recombining the components according to basic physical
principles and natural laws. Thus any analytical approach to
estimating probabilities offailure requires full enumeration of
failure mechanisms, complete identification of natural events,
processes or properties aflecting those failure mechanisms,
and detailed specification of the engineering relationships
within and among mechanisms.
The difficulties of analytically estimating probabilities of dam
failure are that (I) dams can fail through an essentially
infinite number of mechanisms or modes which cannot be fully
enumerated, (2) detailed decomposition of dam peflormance
may lead to events and vpes of physical behaviour that are
even more difficult to analyse than aggregate per$ormance,
and (3) even for those mechanisms commonly analysed by
6

engineers, the present models are deterministic. To date, no
comprehensive attempt at analytical assessment of the
probability of failure for particular dams has been made.
Even tf such analyses were possible, because both the
modeling and the assignment of probabilities are necessarily
subjective, the results might not be repeatable.
Perhaps the most severe limitation of analytical approaches is
due to the fact that most failures of constructed facilities occur
in ways that cannot be analyzed. Recent studies of the
historical occurrence of structural failures seem to indicate
that possibly as few as 10% are attributable to mechanisms
within the scope of present or prospective methods of
engineering analysis [quoting Flint et al., 19761. Most
failures occur due to accident, inadequate construction
control, or poorly understood physical processes. There is
every reason to think that this situation also applied to dams.
Therefore, any analytically derived probability of failure is
only likely to be a lower bound.
Analytical predictions of probabilities of failure leading to
more accurate estimates than that obtained@om the historical
Fundamentally,
record do not seem possible at present.
analytical procedures
suffer from
requiring
explicit
identification
of failure mechanisms, which cannot be
completely enumerated. Analytical predictions also suffer by
the inadequacy of engineering science to explain fully all
aspects of dam behavior.
While future development may
broaden the applicability of reliability modeling of dams, and
while certain naturally recurring hazards can be analyzed,
overall reliance on analytical procedures
to obtain
probabilities of failure seems premature, at best, and may
actually be logically impossible. ”
These and other technical difficulties inhibited the application
of risk analysis in dam safety in the 1980’s. There was
significant research interest in risk-based decision analysis,
and a so-called ‘judgmental technique’ aimed at overcoming
the technical difficulties mentioned above emerged (NRC,
1983). In terms of the judgmental approach, “the investigator
attempts to quantify his judgment based on all available
information. The judgmental statement may be made directly
in terms of annual probability offailure of the dam due to a
particular condition (e.g. probability offailure due to internal
erosion = I x IV3 annually), in terms of the chance offailure
over a specified remaining operational life of the dam, or as a
fraction of the probability associated with other modes (e.g.,
about twice the risk attributable to flooding and overtopping).
However, when the literature on risk-based methods is
reviewed in the context of dam safety in general, a different
picture emerges. With the exception of the large selfregulating US Federal dam agencies (Bureau of Reclamation
and Corps of Engineers), involvement of dam owners and dam
safety regulators in the development of risk-based methods
was almost non-existent with few actual applications in
practice. In fact, the wider dam engineering community
remained highly suspicious, even critical of, risk-based
approaches to dam safety decision-making.
Dr. Ralph Peck, widely recognised as having unparalleled
knowledge and experience in the field of dam design and dam
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safety was clearly not convinced by the arguments in favour of
risk-based dam safety. Dr. Peck eloquently and effectively
expressed his concerns (Peck, 1980, 1982); but he was not
alone, as similar views were held (and remain held) by the
majority of dam engineers. In fact, Peck’s 1980 paper “Where
has all the Judgment Gone?” includes, as a reference, the
paper by Baecher et al. and the question “‘Where has all the
Judgement Gone?” follows a discussion on the use of the base
rate of dam failures of 10e4as a ‘default value’.
In his “Comments on Risk Analysis for Dams” where he
provided strong arguments against proposals Co quantify risks
posed by dams, Dr. Peck made the following remarks:
.
‘A risk analysis of a dam having the potential for failing
by piping would be meaningless if it did not consider
these [previously discussed] factors, because these are the
factors that decide the safety of the dam. When the state
of the art of risk analysis is capable of doing this, I shall
become an enthusiastic supporter. I think this may be
possible, and I endorse eflorts to that end. I don ‘t believe
the time is now. I don ‘t believe the implication of all
these factors can be quanttfied by asking the most
qualified experts to choose a number between 1 and IO.
l

In its present state, risk analysis provides powerful
insights into the relative importance of various factors
affecting the safety of dams, especially with respect to
hydrology reservoir operation, and seismic events. Its
contribution in assessment of stability seems, tfmy former
colleagues will forgive me, somewhat academic.
Its
application to assessment of the risk of subsuflace erosion
and piping, especially tf it diminishes design for defense
in depth, could be dangerous. The experience that leads
to the art of design for defense in depth is not experience
that develops an expert in risk analysis; an enormous
amount of interaction will be needed before I should want
to see so fundamental a change in design philosophy. ”
(Peck, 1982)

In 1983, Dr. Rasmussen (of nuclear power plant fame), when
invited to speak at a joint Stanford-MIT conference on the
issue of how risk analysis might be applied to dams, is reputed
to have expressed the view that not enough is known about
dams to make a risk analysis of dam failures (Jones, 1999).
The International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD) view
was as follows: “In most cases, computation of the overall
probability offailure of a given dam would require so many
assumptions, affected by such a high degree of uncertainty,
that the Jinal figure would not be of any practical value for
project design and a judgement of its safety. ” With regard to
statistics, the ICOLD position was that “a statistical figure
derived -from historical records of failure and the number of
existing dams has no relevance to an individual dam and
would do injustice to a dam carefully designed, constructed,
operated and maintained by competent engineers” (ICOLD,
1987).
The Utah Power and Light study (Waite, 1989, a) provides
valuable insights into the regulatory acceptance of Risk-Based
Decision Analysis (termed a risk assessment) and some of the
difficulties faced by dam owners. It also provides insight into
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what would become contentious issues for debate in the
1990’s - costs of retrofitting dams to ever-increasing
deterministic safety standards and costs of risk analyses!
Waite’s open and IYank description of the discomfort of the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) is as follows:
“FERC staff was uncomfortable with our decision, and they
have our sympathy in this regard. We think they visualized the
result, could be a whitewash of genuine safety problems,
inadvertently
or
intentionally
superficial,
politically
controversial, and not result in a truly balanced evaluation or
solution.
They seemed particularly concerned that the
technical and economic review would have insuficient depth
to provide an eflective information base and that insuficient
information was generally available to make reliable risk
judgments. Thley said such a “risk assessment” would miss
too many factors and details, currently handled as intangible
factor-of-safety components, and result in a rislry model. Even
tf we did a proper job on the evaluation, we think that FERC
was concerned about a possible precedent that would allow
later, less well founded work by others jeopardize industry
safety standards.
The decision to go ahead with the risk
assessment was executed with mixed feelings within our own
organization too. ” (Waite, 1989, a).
Waite also provided some useful insights into lessons learned
from the study. Two valuable insights, one posed as a
question were:
.
“Procedurally, did the study go as anticipated? No, not
entirely. Personally, ifI had to do it again, I would insist
on physical evaluation of the facilities condition being
given greater emphasis. Ifyou don’t examine existing
conditions closely, you willprobably learn your lesson
later.
.
Don’t short change the development of the details in a risk
assessment. ” (Waite 1989, b).
The State-of-the-ArVPractice in the 1980’s. The literature on
risk analysis for dams presents a broad spectrum of views
ranging 6om creating the impression that there were no
difficulties to be resolved at one end of the spectrum to
insurmountable problems at the other.
A balanced and
informed view can only be obtained from a broad, in-depth
examination of all of the issues involved. Clearly, while such
a treatment is beyond the scope of this paper, the review
suggests that, at the end of the 1980’s, fundamental theoretical
and practical difficulties existed which would have to be
resolved before risk analysis could become an established and
accepted process for analysing the safety of dams. The unique
nature of dams, the poor understanding of the causes of
failure, the complex nature of risk and the general problem of
experience referred to by Casagrande, clearly posed enormous
problems. The task that existed at the start of the 1990’s of
resolving these difficulties
in a generally acceptable,
mathematically correct and scientifically valid way to permit
risk analysis for dams to become an accepted practice was not
a trivial one.
The difficulties that have been identified do not mean that the
activities of the 1970’s and 1980’s were not of considerable
value; they were, but they did not meet the overall objective of
determining if a dam is safe enough. I hold the view that
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significant advances in understanding of risk analysis of dams
were achieved during the first twenty-five year period since
Casagrande proposed the concept.
The research and
development work carried out at MIT, Stanford and other
centres of learning, together with that carried out by the
Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers provided a
conceptual base horn which to work.
The pioneering
applications of the concepts embodied in the USBR’s
Guidelines to Decision Analysis provided the basis of future
applications of risk analysis in formal assessment of risk posed
by dams.
This said, the ‘State-of-the-Art/Practice of risk analysis of
dams at the end of the 1980’s had not progressed to formal
risk assessment, although the Tongue River Dam Risk
Assessment had captured most of the essential features,
without the benefit of the vitally important detailed analytical
probability estimation processes and the risk evaluation
component.
An interesting feature of the ‘State-of-theArt/Practice’ at the end of the 1980’s was that, for practical
purposes, the analytical procedures had not really evolved
during the decade. Of the three basic approaches to estimating
dam response probabilities:
I. The analytical @robability) approach,
2. The empirical (historical frequency) approach, and,
3. The judgmental approach
a combination of the latter two were used throughout the
decade (e.g. Bowles, 1989).
Although not stated explicitly, the three approaches to
probability estimation were treated as equivalent with NRC
(NRC, 1983) clearly stating that “a combination of empirical
and judgmental approaches appears to be most practical at
the present time. However, the validity of this assertion was
not demonstrated, and it does require the questionable mixing
of the objective and subjective philosophies of probability
theory.
The procedure was as follows (NRC, 1983):
.
“‘Historical failure probabilities can be obtained for
specific conditions and types of structures, but they need
to be adjusted based on the conditions at a particular
dam.
.
This adjustment is based on the inspection, analysis, and
judgment
of the engineers pellforming
the safety
evaluation of the dam.
.
The two estimates may be combined by means of a
Bayesian updating procedure in which a weight is
assigned to the relative confidence in each of the
estimates (historical and engineer s judgment). ”
Of course, such a procedure cannot be applied in the absence
of historical data on dam failures, something that is extremely
sparse for seismically induced failures. Further and probably
even more importantly, the procedure overlooks the simple
fact that none of the dams in the database have the “historical
failure probability”. Historical failure probability (frequency)
is a mathematical property of the population of failed dams as
a proportion of the total (a small number of l’s and a larger
number of O’s). The weighting procedure (step 3) also raises
questions concerning how the engineer makes the estimate as
it is already a weighted version (site-specific adjustments up
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or down) of the historical frequency (step 1). Of course, the
procedure breaks down completely if the historical failure
frequency for a particular class of dam and hazard is zero
because judgment is based on knowledge, and knowledge is
familiarity gained by actual experience, directly or indirectly
through others (DiBiagio and Hoeg, 1989). Another difficulty
relates to the non-intuitive nature of probability and the
numerous examples of ‘judgments’ of probability being
spectacularly wrong!
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The risk estimation procedure was generally represented by a
three-step process, which towards the end of the 1980’s was
often illustrated in a simplified three-step event tree where the
system response was modelled in two steps as illustrated in
Fig. I-2. Event trees of this nature, and this particular example,
are simply graphical illustrations of the tabular representation
of the example presented in Appendix A of the USBR’s 1986
Embankment Dams Design Standard No. 13, Chapter 14,
Guidelines on Decision Analysis (USBR, 1984), as previously
described by NRC (NRC, 1983).
Considering all of the above, the process whereby reliable
estimates of response probabilities for individual, unique
dams, concerning events that are beyond experience and not
readily analysed, using statistics from a sparse and
heterogeneous database can be ‘judged’ was not at all clear.
What was also not clear was the meaning of these ‘blended
probabilities’.
Probabilities of system response were typically assigned using
the ‘judgmental’ approach with sensitivity studies carried out
to determine the sensitivity of the outcome to these variations
in inputs. The accounts of how these judgmental probabilities
are arrived at generally refer to probabilities being estimated
based on engineering analysis, experience and judgement
(NRC, 1983, and Bowles, 1989) without applying a procedure
of the type suggested by Whitman. Importantly, applications
of risk analysis in dam safety in the 1980’s did not employ the
‘type A ’ predictive models referred to by Lambe (Lambe,
1973).
Further and importantly,
the significant advances in
geotechnical earthquake engineering, and in particular the
advances in liquefaction, were not employed in risk analyses
for dams even though liquefaction risk was amenable, in
principle at any rate, to quantification (NRC, 1985, a, Liao et
al, 1988). In many respects, advances in geotechnical and
earthquake engineering
were not finding widespread
application in risk analysis for dams.
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Fig. I-2 Simplified Event Tree for Hypothetical Dam
Considering Hydrologic Loading (afrer Bowles et al. I987)
In summary, interest in risk-based decision-making did not
translate into action in any significant way in the 1980’s.
What was termed ‘risk assessment’ in the dam industry was
actually what had become generally known as a grossly
simplified form of risk estimation in other hazardous
industries. This ‘generally loose’ use of terminology was a
source of considerable confusion.
The State-of-theArt/Practice of risk analysis in the 1980’s was essentially
established prior to 1983and applied by the USBR (NRC,
1983).
The NRC view (NRC, 1985, b) was that “the
quantitative risk-cost analysis approach has been applied to
very f&v dams and is such a recent development that it can be
barely calIed “current practice I’.
In general, proponents of risk-based methods were generally
unsuccessful in providing convincing, scientifically based
arguments to advance the concept to routine practice. The
profession was clearly divided, and there was no regulatory
acceptance of risk assessment in dam safety practice.
Applications of risk-based methods were the exception rather
than the norm, the scientific and theoretical basis for the
analysis methods had not been established in an engineering
sense, and none of the applications answered the question “Is
the dam safe enough? ”
Level Of Interest In Risk-Based Dam Safetv DecisionMaking. Towards the late 1980’s dam owners, faced with
ever increasing design standards for dams, began to show an
interest in risk-based decision-making. Many owners were
faced with the prospect of ever increasing costs associated
with retrofitting their dams to meet new design standards. The
cost of retrofitting old dams to new standards tends to be
enormous, with benefit-cost ratios generally substantially less
than 1.0. The economics of dam safety simply did not add up,
and it was not possible to develop business cases for dam
safety improvements in the normal way. The situation faced
by Utah Power and Light (Waite, 1989, a) was not unique.
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FIRST STEPS IN FORMAL RISK ANALYSIS AND RISK
ASSESSMENT - THE EARLY 1990’S
BC Hydro, the Provincially owned hydroelectric utility of
British Columbia, was the frost major dam owner to seriously
attempt to answer the questions How Safe is the Dam?...Is it
Safe Enough? using risk assessment techniques.
G.M.
Salmon, BC Hydro’s Director of Dam Safety initially sought
assistance 6om the USBR’s Mr. J. L. Von Thun who had been
heavily involved in developing the USBR’s Risk-Based
Guidelines on Decision Analysis. Early on (1991) Salmon
suggested that it might be possible to measure the safety of a
dam in terms of the expected value of the loss. Recognising
the immense difficulties associated with monetising the value
of human life, Salmon proposed that life safety be considered
separately 6om monetary losses. He suggested that an
expected value for loss of life Elireloss> 0.001 lives/dam/year
would constitute a level of risk to the public that would be
unacceptable (BC Hydro, 1991). The commencement of BC
Hydro’s initiative coincided with the publication of the
Canadian Standards Association’s National Standard on Risk
Analysis Requirements and Guidelines (Canadian Standards
Association (CSA), 199 1).
Salmon recognised that analytical procedures would be
necessary to make reasonable estimates of the risk posed by a
dam, and he instituted a major development initiative aimed at
determining the risk posed by dams by means of analytical
techniques. BC Hydro took on the challenge of advancing the
state of knowledge beyond the grossly simplified approaches
of risk estimation used in the existing risk-based decision
analysis technique by moving to de-compositional analysis.

The ‘basic’ approach to characterising the seismic hazard at a
dam site was the principal method used in dam risk analyses in
the 1990’s. While useful for providing an initial estimate of
the seismic hazard, the technique falls short of full
probabilistic characterisation of the risk. 1995 saw a move
towards more comprehensive characterisation of the seismic
hazard by including explicit treatment of the aleatory and
epistemic uncertainties, as shown in Fig. I-4.

Fig. I-3. Basic Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis (1992)

Elements of Enhanced PtiSA

A number of projects were initiated to investigate how to
estimate probabilities of:
.
Extreme loads on dams (large earthquakes and floods)
.
Dam responses and failure mechanisms, and
l
Dam failure consequences.
A separate project was initiated to provide a framework for the
risk assessment process to integrate the various analytical
components, to establish potential risk-based decision criteria
through a risk evaluation process, and to assessthe risk posed
by the dam to determine if it is safe enough.
In keeping with BC Hyclro’s tradition of bringing an
appropriate level of expertise to bear on difficult dam
engineering problems, BC Hydro engaged advisory panels of
internationally recognised experts in the various disciplines
involved to guide the investigations. The projects were led by
BC Hydro senior engineering staff supplemented by
consultants. Originally, it was not intended to develop new
theoretical models and analytical techniques, but rather to
build on existing techniques by adapting them to suit the types
of problems in hand. In this regard, the probabilistic seismic
hazard analysis studies were relatively straightforward as
analytical techniques had been introduced over twenty years
previously and subsequently refined. By 1992, BC Hydro had
performed ‘basic’ probabilistic hazard analyses, as depicted in
(Fig. I-3), for all of its dam sites.
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Fig. I-4 ‘Enhanced ’ Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analysis
(since 1995 at BC Hydro)
The first ‘experiment’ using the de-compositional event tree
approach was carried out on BC Hydro’s Terzaghi Dam.
However, the study raised more questions than it provided
answers, and it was terminated without being brought to a
conclusion.
Therefore it was not possible to draw any
conclusions about the validity of the analysis method or to
make any inferences concerning the safety of the dam on the
basis of this study. BC Hydro consented to the publication of
brief accounts of the principles involved in this analysis (e.g.
Vick and Stewart, 1996) with the view to gauging the reaction
of the profession.
This consent does not constitute
endorsement of either the method of analysis or any inferences
that might be made concerning the safety status of the dam.
In early 1993, the general feeling in BC Hydro’s engineering
group was that estimation of risk through analytical means
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was easier said than done.
Analysis of risk through
decomposition of the various aspects of the physical
phenomena involved into their tindamental components was
recognised as being extremely difficult and required very
significant effort and expertise. This realisation cast serious
doubts as to the validity of existing ‘judgmental’ estimation of
dam response probabilities. In summary, the question “lf Ihe
problem is difficult to analyse, then how can one make
reasonable judgements of the probable response of the dam to
extreme loads?” arose and was one of the most vexing
questions raised by these pilot studies as it called into question
the methods used to estimate probabilities in existing riskbased decision analysis methodologies.
BC Hydro’s engineers understood that to succeed it would be
necessary to develop robust ‘de-compositional’ models of dam
failure mechanisms. This required that they address issues
deemed by others (e.g. Peck, 1980, Baecher et al, 1980) to be
‘nigh on impossible ‘. With the added complication that, even
if general theories of dam failure could be developed, they
would necessarily require refinement to account for the unique
features of each dam and dam site. Although these pilot
studies did not provide scientifically based analytical
techniques that could be applied with confidence, they did
suggest that it might be possible to estimate risks posed by
dams along the lines suggested by Whitman. The ‘apparent
alternative’ was to fix tindamental
mathematical and
philosophical problems with the ‘empirical/judgmental’
approach to estimating dam response probabilities.
This
course of action was ruled out, not just because of the
intractability of the mathematical problems but also because it
was clearly understood that the event tree model of the failure
process and the probabilities assigned at nodes in the tree were
inextricably linked (Hartford and Salmon, 1995).
This
problem here being that the ‘probability’ is an artefact of the
model and the manner in which epistemic and aleatory
uncertainty are represented.
BC Hydro’s framework for risk assessment was established in
September 1993 in the form of ‘Interim Guidelines ‘, which
included a trial example of an event tree analysis for extreme
floods and earthquakes (BC Hydro, 1993). The Interim
Guidelines were presented for discussion within the
profession, and summary papers were issued over the next two
years.
Shortly thereafter in January 1994 and entirely
independently, the Australian National Committee on Large
Dams (ANCOLD) issued Guidelines on Risk Assessment for
Dams (ANCOLD, 1994). The ANCOLD guidelines and the
BC Hydro Interim Guidelines were conceptually very similar.
According to ANCOLD, “the immediate objective of many of
those advocating risk assessment in current practice is to
provide defensible design solutions as economic optima that
are likely to be of lower cost than those that result from a
traditional engineering standards approach to design. ”
At the time, this analysis work did not meet with any serious
objections, and this created the impression that all of the
problems of analysing risk posed by dams had been resolved.
In other words, it appeared that the concerns of Casagrande,
Peck and others as well as the issues outlined by Baecher et al.
might have been adequately addressed. This is not to say that
there was not scepticism; there was (e.g. Fanelli, 1991, Lafitte,
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1992, 1993, Lombardi, 1993, Ruggeri et al., 1993), but the
written objections were not specific to the method of analysis.
Further, risk assessment, which includes the use of risk
analysis to address life safety issues for dams, did generate
significant critical comment. However discussion of these
broader policy issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
This lack of adverse comment on the analytical procedures
was of concern to me and other BC Hydro staff, as initiatives
of this nature are inevitably controversial. Given the divisions
in the profession, the almost unquestioned acceptance of the
approach by sections of the dam engineering community was
disconcerting. This lack of adverse comment concerning the
analytical procedures could not be interpreted as general
acceptance of risk assessment. Absence of evidence cannot be
interpreted as evidence of absence!
One section of the dam safety profession appeared to accept
that dam failure processes could be described by a relatively
small number of failure modes: two extreme-event failure
mode initiators, earthquake and flood, and one general ‘static’
failure mode. Further, there was little or no delbate concerning
the difference between this ‘de-compositional’ approach and
the ‘empiricaYjudgmenta1’ approach. The de-compositional
models of failure mechanisms for each failure mode appeared
to be accepted at face value; partly it seems because the
models depicted generally accepted descriptions of failure
mechanisms. The question as to whether or not the failure
mechanism was fully decomposed into its fundamental parts
required attention.
In BC Hydro’s early risk analysis ‘experimenfls’, probabilities
were assigned using the scheme proposed by Vick (1992) for
transforming verbal descriptions of the ‘degree-of-belief of
the study team to numerical values. SuccessM application of
this mapping scheme depends on Bernoulli’s Principle of
Indifference being valid.
1 Verbal descrintor
Event is virtually certain

0.99

Event is very likely

0.9

1 Completely and totally uncertain’. ’
7--

1 Pkobabilitv

1 0.5

Event is very unlikely

0. I

Event is virtually impossible but cannot
be physically ruled out

0.01

I

Table I-2. Mapping scheme suggested by Vick (I 992)
Although not known at the time, this was the ‘Kent Chart’
approach to quantifying verbal descriptions of probability
which had previously been tried and subsequently abandoned
by US military intelligence (Cooke, 1991), Further, the
approach did not find much in the way of acceptance in
Australia where investigations into risk analysis were also
being carried out. The issue of assigning a probability P = 0.5
as representing uncertainty raised the most serious concerns
’ Vick subsequently
revised the descriptor
adding that the condition
*as no preference
for either outcome.
’ The US Bureau of Reclamation
uses the term ‘neutral’ to describe

that there
ho

preferencefor eirheroutcome’.
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P = 0.5 occurs in many problems of probability, the most well
known one being flipping coins. However, hidden in much
literature discussion of the meaning of P = 0.5 is Bernoulli’s
“Principle of Insufficient Reason” (the name is due to Von
Kries -(Howson and Urbach, 1991)). Keynes (Keynes, 193 1)
described it, the “Principle of Indifference”,
a description
also preferred by modem philosophers (Howson and Urbach,
1991).
According to Keynes; “The principle of indifference asserts
that ifthere is no known reason forpredicating
of our subject
one rather than another of several alternatives, then relative
to such knowledge the assertion of each of these alternatives
have an equal probability.
Thus equal probabilities must be
assigned to each of several arguments, if there is an absence
ofpositive grounds for assigning unequal ones “.
Keynes was highly critical of Bernoulli’s principle, largely
because it leads to paradoxical and contradictory conclusions.
He quoted several, but the engineering/scientific example
attributed to Von Kries presented by Keynes and reproduced
below provides a useful insight into one of the many
difficulties.
“Consider the specific volume of a given substance. Let us
suppose that we know the spec$c volume to lie between I and
3, but we have no information as to whereabouts in this
The principle of
interval its exact value is to be found.
indifference would allow us to assume that it is as Iikely to lie
between I and 2 as between 2 and 3; for there is no reason for
supposing that it lies in one interval rather than in the other.
But now consider the specific density. The specific density is
the reciprocal of the specif;c volume, so that if the latter is v,
the former is I/v. Our data remaining as before, we know that
the specific density must lie between I and IN. and, by the
same use of the principle of indifference as before, that it is as
likely to be between 1 and 2/3 and 2/3 and l/3. But the
specific volume being a determinate function of the specific
density, tf the iatter lies between I and 2/3, the former lies
between I and 1%. and if the latter lies between 2/3 and l/3,
the former lies between 1% and 3. It follows, therefore, that
the specific volume is as likely to lie between 1 and I % as
between 1% and 3; whereas we have already proved,
relatively to precisely the same data, that it is as likely to lie
between 1 and 2 as between 2 and 3. I’
Von Kries’ complete treatment was not left uncriticised but
according to Keynes, the criticism could not “restore the credit
of the principle of indifference”. Keynes continued,
“Moreover, any other firnction of the specific volume would
have suited our purpose equally well, and by a suitable choice
of thisfitnction we might have proved in a similar manner that
any division whatever of the interval 1 to 3 yields sub-intervals
of equal probability. Specific volume and speciJic density are
simply alternative methods of measuring the same objective
quantity; and there are many methods which might be
adopted, each yielding on the application of the principle of
indifference a different probability for a given obj’ective
variation in the quantity. ”
The specific volume/density example is just one of a great
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many instances where the principle of indierence produces
untenable outcomes, and this example illustrates just one of
the many issues that one needs to be cogrrisant of when
assigning P = 0.5.
Ironically, Keynes, in an attempt to overcome the problem of
inconsistency inherent in the Principle of Indifference,
developed his own version; however, he did not succeed in
overcoming the fundamental problems with the concept.
One of the dilemmas that all of this poses for risk analysts is
as follows:
Compare the case where all of the evidence shows that 50% of
the evidence supports a proposition and 50% supports its
antithesis with that of the case where there is no evidence to
support the hypothesis or its antithesis and therefore no reason
to prefer one hypothesis over the other. Perfect knowledge
and complete ignorance are represented by the same
‘Probability’.
Some challenges associated with the above discussion on
probability is that dam risk analysts need to clearly explain
and communicate:
.
What they mean by probability
.
How they assemble the evidence
l
What they mean by P = 0.5, and
.
How they translate the evidence into numerical values of
probability.
“Before the ascendance of the modem theory, the notion of
equal probabilities was often used as synonymous for “no
advanced knowledge. ” (Feller, 1968). There is no place for
Bernoulli’s Principle of Indifference in the modem theory of
probability, although an analogous principle holds in the
probability of gambling. This is an important distinction as
‘indifference’ concerning the outcome of a gamble and ‘equal
weights of evidence’.
In addition to the problem with P = 0.5, the mapping scheme
did not clearly outline that the probability was a measure of
the degree of confidence that the individuals had in their belief
in the outcome at each node in the event tree.
By 1994, the ‘trial’ approach to dam risk analysis that BC
Hydro was experimenting with became a ‘commodity
engineering’ service. It was possible for owners to issue
requests for proposals for what appeared to be the BC Hydro
type of risk analysis service and to receive offers to perform
the work. In-house engineering staff in other utilities also
began to implement the approach. However, BC Hydro’s
Interim Guidelines, which for many was a principal source of
reference, contained the results of only one pilot study and
importantly, the procedures for conducting the analysis were
not included as they had not been developed. However the
situation was rather more complex and any impression that
quantitative risk analysis could be treated as a routine
engineering service was clearly without foundation.
At the early stages, BC Hydro’s strategy was to apply existing
or proposed methods of analysis to a wide range of dam safety
issues. One objective of this strategy was to use the insights
generated to enhance on-going dam safety decision-making.
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A second objective was to identify through experience of
application, the strengths and weaknesses of existing or
proposed risk analysis methodologies.
The ‘practice’ that
emerged in 1994 had been established in the absence of the
necessary investigations into the strengths and weaknesses of
the proposed method.
Further, the ‘practice’ was not
necessarily delivering the proposed ‘BC Hydro’ approach.
The approach that emerged in the State of Victoria in Australia
for portfolios of dams was a hybrid of the USBR’s risk-based
decision analysis and the BC Hydro decision criteria. (e.g.
SMECRAC, 1995, Watson et al., 2000). Although termed risk
assessments, these approaches are not risk assessments in the
accepted sense, and no analytical procedures were used to
estimate the risk.
Because its dam safety program was quite mature and most of
the obvious issues had been identified through the use of
traditional methods of analysis, BC Hydro also had an interest
in the many aspects of dam safety decision-making not readily
addressed by conventional analytical methods. Risk analysis
was seen as having the potential to extend conventional dam
safety analysis to consider the dam as a system and to consider
all aspects of behaviour in a consistent manner.
The successful application of risk analysis in any dam safety
program requires the development of a robust and fully
integrated general set of theories of dam failure processes. It
also requires the development of a database of experience and
evidence to validate the theories, and to make possible the
exercise of judgement by suitably experienced dam engineers
for application in specific cases.
In 1994, as part of its strategy, in response to concerns
expressed by some of BC Hydro’s engineering staff, and in the
absence of significant criticism of the proposed analytical
procedures, BC Hydro’s risk analysis project staff began to
investigate the validity of various aspects of the analysis
procedures.
Some of the reasons for the concerns were:
1. Pilot analyses of concrete dams tended to produce much
shorter event trees and much higher failure probabilities
than earthtill dams, especially under earthquake and flood
loading conditions. This led to the inference that concrete
dams were much more vulnerable than earthfill dams, an
inference that is not supported by the historic evidence of
the generally better performance of concrete dams!
2. The estimate of risk was found to be highly dependent on
how the failure process was modelled.
3. In some cases, the estimate of risk was found to be highly
dependent on the individuals estimating the probabilities,
with no means of discriminating between estimators.
4. In other cases, the estimate of risk was not sensitive to the
probabilities assigned if complementary paths at certain
nodes in the event tree model led to failure.
5. In most cases, the pilot analyses indicated that the risk
associated with combinations of conditions associated
with less than the most extreme earthquakes and floods
constituted the highest proportion of the risk. Here again,
it was not clear if this phenomenon was an artefact of the
model and the people making the estimate.
6. There was concern that the estimate of risk was an
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artefact of:
.
The event tree.
.
The scheme for assigning probabilities.
.
The knowledge and biases of the person assigning the
probabilities and not a ‘measure’ of the safety of the
dam.
Other issues included:
.
The need to demonstrably and effectively address the
concerns of the various eminent experts who had
previously cast doubts as to the feasibility ~ofrisk analysis.
.
The clearly identified difference in level of effort between
analytically derived probabilities
and ‘judgmental’
probabilities.
l
The compatibility of estimates of failure probabilities
made using analytical techniques and the ‘judgmental’
estimates made in terms of the procedures outlined by
NRC (NRC, 1983) and still used in practiae (SMECALAC,
1995).
An underlying concern can be summarised as: “Is this too
good to be true?” It appeared that teams of dam safety
engineers could assign ‘subjective probabilitie$’ based on their
‘degree-of-belief in a hypothesis and be able to quantify the
risk due to all dam failure modes in about a week! This was
achieved in the absence of:
.
Expertise or training in probabilistic reasoning.
.
A statistically valid empirical database of failure modes
mechanisms and frequencies.
l
Robust theories of dam failures.
.
Demonstrably fully decomposed models of the failure
processes.
Another concern of mine was that “the grossly simplified
‘judgmental’ approach could be applied with even less effort
even though probability is notoriously complex with numerous
examples of probability playing tricks with ones intuition and
‘judgement’“.
Questions to be addressed included but were not restricted to:
1. The scientific validity of the de-compositional models of
the failure mechanisms.
2. The mathematical and philosophical basis of the
interpretation of ‘subjective probability’ as applied in the
analyses.
3. The scientific validity of the process for estimating
‘judgmental probabilities’ as assigned by analysis teams.
4. The interaction between the extent of decomposition of
the failure mechanism and the estimate of risk
5. Expertise, experience and knowledge requirements of
analysis teams.
6. Site specific information needs for input to analysis
models.
7. Could anything be done to make the probability estimates
‘tamper-proof and not open to manipulation?
8. The validity of comparing subjective estimates of risk
with objective decision criteria.
9. Was the process of estimating ‘judgmental’ probabilities
really the exercise of judgement or was it something less
and if so how much less?
10. What did the subjective estimates of probability and
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resulting risk estimates actually mean and what can they
be used for?
11. Did the risk analysis process, as implemented, actually
lead to a better understanding of the performance of the
dam under all possible conditions or was the claimed
‘improved understanding’ simply a perception of those
involved?
12. Could dam owners rely on risk analysis as a component of
a dam safety decision-making process?
Clearly, given the broad range of issues to be addressed and
questions to be answered, it would have been inappropriate not
to address them to the fullest possible extent. At the same
time, BC Hydro felt that the appropriate approach was to
continue performing a limited number of risk analyses, while
gradually addressing the issues of concern.
In 1993/94, BC Hydro performed a risk analysis for
seismically induced liquefaction of the foundation soils of its
Murrin 2 Substation. The method of estimating the probability
of liquefaction proposed by Liao et al. (Liao et al., 1988)
provided the basis for the analysis, and Professor Whitman
was engaged to review the work. The geotechnical properties
of the site had been extensively investigated, and there was a
considerable amount of information about the performance of
similar
substation
structures and equipment
during
earthquakes.
Prior to the risk analysis, a Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis (FMEA), facilitated by consultant Steven G. Vick,
was conducted. All of the technical disciplines involved in
determining the effects of earthquakes on the electric system
was represented as were the field staff who operate the system
and managers who would plan the response. The FMEA
provided the necessary precursory collection and formatting of
information necessary to proceed to the risk analysis phase.
This exercise led to BC Hydro adopting the position that
FMEA should be considered as an essential precursor to more
detailed risk analysis studies rather than the more subjective,
unstructured ‘failure mode screening’ typically carried out in
dam safety risk analyses.
In conducting the risk analysis phase, BC Hydro’s engineering
staff departed from the ‘workshop’ approach to constructing
event trees and assigning subjective probabilities as attempted
Instead, the engineers
for dam safety risk analyses.
responsible for the project developed a framework to analyse
the risk and implemented the ‘de-compositional’ approach to
engineering analysis from the top down. The seismic risk
problem for the substation as a whole was ‘decomposed’ into

discipline-based tasks. The discipline-based tasks provided
the sub-frameworks for the ‘de-compositional’ engineering
analysis of each aspect of the problem to be carried out. The
discipline-based tasks were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
Probability of liquefaction analysis
Ground deformation analysis given liquefaction
Ground shaking analysis given no liquefaction
Structural response analysis given deformation
shaking
Structural response analysis given shaking
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and

7.
8.

Damage states analysis
Times to repair analysis

Owing to the nature of the problem, and experience obtained
from California and Japan, the necessary theop-iesand models
were available to perform the analysis (Garner et al., 1998).
The probability of liquefaction of the foubdation fills is
illustrated in Fig. I-5.
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Fig. I-5. Probability of liquefaction ofjoundationJills
Garner el al., I998)

(after

Ground failure phenomena resulting from liquefaction were
expected to have several forms-flow slides, settl ment and lateral
spreading. Lateral spreading occurring in near-9iquefied soils is
considered the most important ground failure m@chanismfor this
site.
Three deterministic methods and one linear re@ressionmethod
were evaluated to establish the most appropdate method for
determining the potential ground movements. pe Bartlett and
Youd method (Bartlett and Youd, 1992) for computing lateral
spreading was chosen as the preferred method of analysis.
Bartlett and Youd’s process requires estimation of the ground
surface PGA which includes amplification effec$s (Garner et al.,
1988).
The results were presented as F-N curves of probability of
substation outages greater than ‘N’ hours. It quickly became
obvious that risk represented in this way was as much an
artefact of the way the data is presented a$ it is the risk
analysis.
Discussion of this issue is unfortunately beyond the scope of

this paper but is mentioned here as F-N curvtz~sfor life safety
considerations for dams began to appear around this time
(ANCOLD, 1994). Despite clear problem4 with the F-N
representation of risk and warnings that it may not be suitable
for situations such as dam failures (HSE, 1999), it remains a
preferred representation of risk to life by some proponents.
The Murrin Substation Risk Analysis demonstrated that, in
principle, the analytical techniques were available to permit
the probability of failure of earth dams to be determined by
analytical means. The next stage in the development of
analytical methods of quantifying the risk posed by dams was
to perform a feasibility study by applying these techniques to a
dam. This feasibility study led to the Keenleyside Dam risk
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analysis, which (as far as I am aware) is the only analytically
based risk analysis of a dam to be completed to date. Details
are presented in Part II of this paper.
In 1995, the USBR joined BC Hydro in its quest for the
answer to the question How Safe Is The Dam?... Is it Safe
Enough? In order to get started in risk assessment and build
on the concepts embodied in their 1989 Policies and
Procedures for Dam Safety Decision-making, the USBR
invited Dr. M.G. Schaefer, Mr. G. Salmon and myself to
present a workshop on risk assessment in dam safety practice.
Dr. Schaefer had led the development of the State of
Washington’s Risk-Based approach to dam safety decisionmaking and was and still is active in the field of quantifying
probabilities of extreme precipitation events.
Towards the end of 1995, BC Hydro published (Hartford and
Salmon, 1995) some of its concerns about the difficulties
associated with de-compositional risk analysis and simplified
‘degree of belief approaches to probability estimation. At the
same time, a feasibility study of the probability of liquefaction
failure of Keenleyside Dam was carried out using the method
of analysis pioneered in the Murrin Substation risk analysis.
Investigations into simplified approaches to specific problems
continued. Also, a firm of consultants was commissioned to
perform a comprehensive quantitative risk analysis of a
concrete dam for all possible failure modes. Despite an
unprecedented level of effort, it was not possible to bring the
risk analysis of the concrete dam to a robust conclusion.
Further, all of the investigations into simplified approaches
failed to provide a satisfactory means of quantifying risk.

THE WATERSHED YEARS: 1995 - 1998
In recognition of the difficulties described above, BC Hydro
adopted a dual strategy (simplified and detailed) of research
and development. This involved continued investigations into
simplified (practical) approaches with parallel investigations
into rigorous methods for estimating risks posed by concrete
and earthfill dams. The most unusual feature of the early
1990’s effort was the concerted attempt to develop a ‘practice’
without first establishing its theoretical foundations.
We
recognised that we were essentially trying to develop
guidelines for risk analysis in dam safety practice in advance
of the usual period of ‘trial and error’. What transpired was
the ‘Achilles heel’ of the early 1990’s attempts to introduce
risk analysis as a professional dam safety service.

professional groups addressed the difficult &sues involved.
Most investigations were carried out by BC Hydro staff
supported by consultants ranging from a highly specialised
team focusing on one hazard and one failure mode, to teams of
generalists using simplified
approaches carrying out
multidisciplinary studies. The concrete dam study, which was
the largest and most comprehensive, was awarded to a firm of
consultants.
This strategy differed from the general trend adopted by most
other investigators who favoured simplified approaches to
failure mechanism modelling,
empirical formulae and
‘empirical/judgmental approaches. At the same time (1996),
the Hume Dam incident prompted a detailed risk analysis in
Australia, which, by default, resulted in an unplanned dual
experience base in Australia.
This development was most unexpected although it was in fact
a case of history repeating itself as ANCOLD’ and BC Hydro
had, in 1994, come to coincident conclusions’concerning the
general principles of risk assessment in dam safety practice.
In adopting the dual strategy, BC Hydro had an unparalleled
experience base to evaluate the success of its investigations.
By 1998, BC Hydro carefully examined the success of the
various initiatives and concluded that ‘simplified approaches’,
while desirable in concept, were not achievable given the
analytical techniques available. BC Hydro also concluded that
detailed analytical estimates of risk could only be made under
very special circumstances because, for the most part, the
necessary analytical procedures were either overly crude or
In particular, BC Hydro concluded that
non-existent.
fundamental philosophical and scientific problems with
simplified de-compositional approaches to failure mechanism
analysis and probability estimation using
‘Kent Charts’
rendered the approach unsuitable for decision-making
concerning the safety of dams. In reality, BC Hydro had
produced empirical evidence supporting the hypotheses of
earlier years mentioned previously (Casagrande, Baecher et
al., Whitman) that reliable quantification of risk would be
difficult and beyond the capability of most engineers. Further,
it was perfectly clear that Lambe’s observation that there was
a need for Type A predictive models was correct.
These were profound developments from an engineering
perspective, because, in principle, Casagrande’s proposal, as
developed by Whitman, was feasible provided Lambe’s Type
A predictive models were available. Importantly these huge

advances in engineering were accompanied by even greater
The ‘simplified path’ recognised the need for pragmatic
approaches to risk management to be applied generally in
practice in an efficient and effective way. The ‘detailed path’
was based on the principle that ‘you only genuinely know if
you have taken a short cut if you have previously reached the
same destination by a longer route’. Essentially we had gone
back to the fundamental philosophies of geotechnical
engineering practice as espoused by Terzaghi in his
Theoretical Soil Mechanics and repeated in Soil Mechanics in
Engineering Practice.
The strategy required several simultaneous studies, and it also
presented an opportunity
to examine how different
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changes in risk management in general.
In 1997, BC Hydro concluded that the ‘engineering’ approach
to risk assessment, i.e. estimate the risk and aompare against
‘arbitrarily selected decision criteria’ for use in decisionmaking was fundamentally flawed. BC Hydro also recognised
that risk analysis was of limited value if it wati not carried out
within a risk management and risk control framework that is
legally defensible and acceptable to knowledgeable regulators
and the public. This led to the development of BC Hydro’s
dam risk management system, the architec e of which is
gaining increasing acceptance in intemationa“5 practice (Fig.
I-6).
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posed by dams were, in principle, in place.
engineering procedures are outlined in Part II.

The analytical

Y2K AND BEYOND
At the time of writing, Y2K is not over and, the outlook for
risk analysis in geotechnical earthquake eng neering beyond
Y2K is somewhat, but not completely, uncle k , as evidenced
by Vol. I of the Proceedings of the 20” ICOLD Congress held
in Beijing in September 2000. The ‘dual pathyi that emerged in
Australia resulted in two apparently diame$ically opposite
points of view. At one extreme there is the view that
“methodologies for estimating the chance of dam failure are
poorly developed and, at the present time, dp not provide a
defensible basis for the conclusive sign offon the safety status
of a dam” (McDonald et al., 2000). At the other extreme,
there is the view that ‘methods are available for estimating
the probabili@ offailure of dams for use in uantitative Risk
Assessmentfor all failure modes” (Fell et al.,
Importantly, the conclusions reached by McDonald et al, who
had explored the detailed analytical approach also coincided
with those of BC Hydro. These observations are further
investigated in Part II of this paper.

Fig. i-6. BC Hydro ‘s Dam Risk Management System
By the end of 1998, BC Hydro’s position concerning the role
of risk analysis in dam safety practice was distinctly different
to contemporary trends, which continued to be based on
simplified approaches. In some respects, we were mistakenly
perceived as having unrealistically high standards employing
‘impractical’ (from the perspective of lowest cost to the owner
and ‘commodity’
engineering
experience)
analytical
procedures. However, we remained undeterred as history
(including our own extensive experience) indicated that
quantitative risk analysis in dam safety practice was difficult
and possibly even impossible for some cases, especially if not
practised within a structured risk management procedure.
THE EVE OF Y2K
As Y2K approached, it became clear that society expected
owners of ‘risky’ facilities to be much more accountable for
the safety management of their operations. The end of the
1990’s saw a paradigm shift in risk regulation with increased
requirements for owners of hazardous facilities to obtain and
maintain public trust. Decisions concerning risk to the public
from engineered facilities no longer rest with owners and their
engineers with the result that decision-making procedures
concerning risk posed by dams would never be the same
again. The most comprehensive treatment of the role of risk
assessment in the management of catastrophic risks (e.g. dam
failures) was produced by the UK Health and Safety Executive
in 1999.
On the eve of Y2K, all of the procedures and requirements for
scientifically valid and legally defensible assessment of risk
Paper No. SOAP - 5
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Screeninglevel studies,which includedfield investigations
PART II
QUANTIFICATION
DAMS

OF SEISMIC

RISK FOR EARTH

CASE STUDY 1 - HUGH KEENLEYSIDE DAM
The purpose of presenting this section in this format of a
“slide presentation” is to illustrate most effectively and
concisely the essential features of one half of a detailed
quantitative risk analysis, recognising that any detailed
account would require an entire volume. This problem was
well recognised by Tenaghi (Terzaghi, 1942) and, because
scientifically-based quantitative risk analysis for dams
requires an enormous amount of effort, it is not amenable to
publication and peer review in the academic journals unless
special arrangements can be made. To date, the necessary
arrangements for publication of peer reviewed papers on
quantitative risk analysis of a scientific nature in the
established engineering and scientific literature has not
occurred.
A very abridged account of one part of the Hugh Keenleyside
Dam quantitative risk analysis is described. The risk analysis
has been restricted to:
.
0 one section of the earthfill dam system (the centre
section),
0 one hazard (seismic) and,
0 one failure mode (seismically-induced liquefaction).
0
I have deliberately omitted one half of the risk analysis, the
consequence analysis.
The Hugh Keenleyside Dam (formerly Arrow Dam) is located
on the Columbia River about 8 km upstream of Castlegar,
British Columbia. The dam impounds the Arrow Lakes
Reservoir, which has a storage volume of 8.8 x lo9 m3 and
extends 233 km north to the city of Revelstoke. The regulation
of this reservoir, under the terms of the Columbia River
Treaty, provides both flood control and increased
hydroelectric generation at plants located further downstream
in the United States. There are currently no power generation
facilities at this dam.
The dam, which has a total length of 810 m, comprises a 58 m
high concrete gravity structure, 360 m in length, a navigation
lock, concrete bulkhead sections and a 52 m high earthfill dam
450 m in length.
The impervious barrier comprises an
upstream till core connected to an impervious blanket that
extends 670 m upstream.
In 1990, BC Hydro’s seismic hazard studies indicated that
updated seismic design parameters were significantly higher
than those used for the original design of the project over 25
years ago. Consequently, seismic stability studies of the
concrete dam and earthfill dam were initiated in 1990 and
1991 respectively. The seismic study of the earthfill dam was
initiated to assess the liquefaction potential and seismic
stability of the earthfill dam and foundation materials.
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and simplified analyses, indicated that extensive liquefaction
could be triggered during the Maximum Design Earthquake
(MDE) in the lower 20f m of the earthfill dam. Subsequently,
additional field and laboratory investigations and more
detailed analyses were carried out.
Keenleyside
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Probabilistic Seismic Hazard Analvsis
A state-of-the-art probabilistic seismic hazard analysis
(PSHA) was carried out by BC Hydro, which permitted
probabilistic description of
l
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA),
l
Peak Ground Velocity (PGV),
l
Spectral Acceleration (S,),
l
Magnitude,
l
Epicentral distance, and
l
Response spectrum.
The enhanced PSHA considered both aleatory and epistemic
uncertainties, with the “mean” seismic hazard expressed as
annual exceedance frequency of the peak ground acceleration,
together with confidence bands (expressed as f&tiles).
Owing to the general lack of defined faults, the average
potential hazard across the region was used as the basis for
characterising the seismic hazard. The outputs of the PSHA
were expressed in the various forms required for the dam
response analysis.
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Dam Response Analvsis
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Typical seismic parameters required as input to assessthe dam
response were:
. PGA and S, hazards, complete with mean values and the
uncertainties,
l
De-aggregation of the seismic hazard by magnitude and
distance,
l
Uniform hazard response spectra, and,
0 Parameters for assisting in time history selection.
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The first stage of the dam response analysis involved a
dynamic analysis of the main section of the earthfill dam. The
inputs to the analysis comprised the outputs of the PSHA and
the geotechnical parameters of the soil materials comprising
the dam and the foundation as obtained from field and
laboratory investigations..
Focus for the dam response
analysis was obtained by first performing a simplified
screening analysis using basic calculations and empirical
ChiWtS.
This was followed by detailed analysis generally
involving dynamic response analyses using up to six
earthquake records as inputs. The outputs of the PSHA were
treated “deterministically” by selecting appropriate values of
peak ground acceleration (PGA) and the currently accepted
maximum magnitude of the design earthquake @IDE) (e.g.
PGA with an annual exceedance frequency (AEF) of lo’,
coupled with a magnitide of = 6.5).
The matter of
deterministic definition of the MDE on the basis of PSI-IA is
controversial and is t3rther complicated by enormous
inconsistencies between deterministic performance goals for
earthquake and flood hazards. Treatment of the problem of
seismic performance goals is beyond the scope of this lecture,
but it is worth noting that these problems are restricted to
deterministic performance goals, problems that are overcome
in the risk assessment approach. Design spectrum were based
on the 1991 work of Idriss, supplemented with the later update
presented by Idriss (1998).
Detailed original site investigation and construction records
were available.
In addition, the results of detailed
investigations of the dam carried out in the 1990’s using stateof the-art investigative techniques were collected. Exploration
methods included standard and cone penetration tests with
appropriate consideration of the method of penetration and
energy calibration. For the more gravelly soils, the Becker
penetration test, with appropriate corrections, was used. The
gravely nature of the soils, which were barge dumped through
flowing water at the time of construction, posed significant
challenges both for investigation and subsequent analysis.
For the purpose of modelling liquefaction, it was assumed that
the established model for seismically induced liquefaction of
granular soils applied, although there was some uncertainty
concerning the validity of this assumption. This assumption
was subsequently investigated further.
The fundamental
features of ‘the model were:
l
When loose granular soil is subjected to vibration or
cyclic shear loading, the soil skeleton tends to compact to
a smaller volume.
l
If the soil is saturated and the water within the pore is
prevented from draining, the load originally carried by the
soil skeleton is gradually transferred from the
intergranular stress to the pore water.
l
With the reduction in the intergranular stress, the stiffness
and the shear strength of the soil become smaller and
smaller.
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The consequence is that the deformation becomes larger
and larger. When the strength becomes less than the
static shear load, FLOW SLIDE becomes likely

The Lower San Fernando Dam case history of seismically
induced liquefaction
and slumping provides empirical
Soil
evidence supporting the modelling assumptions.
liquefaction triggering was based on the work of Seed et al.
(1984-1985)

Soil Liquefaction

dependent stress-strain relationship. The dynamic response
analysis involved an ‘equivalent linear analysis’ where,
through iteration, the shear moduli in different layers were
compatible with the average strains developed.:
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For the purposes of obtaining the cyclic stress ratio (CSR)
from l-Dimensional (SHARE) (Schnabel et. al, 1972) and 2Dimensional (FLUSH) (Lysmer et. al, 1975, 1979) time
history dynamic response analyses, three to five earthquake
records were selected for the deterministic analyses based on
the peak ground acceleration, magnitude and the shape of the
design spectrum. The calculated CSR was then used to
determine the zones of liquefaction and high excess pore
pressure. This provided the ability to determine the post
earthquake stability using limit equilibrium analysis, or post
earthquake deformation (crest slumping) using ftite element
deformation analysis.
The selected earthquake record, expressed in terms of
acceleration time history, served as the input to the dynamic
analysis (SHARE model), which utilised a non-linear strain
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The output of the SHAKE analysis for the two representative
columns provided the calculated variation of CSR with depth
at the specified locations. Zones of liquefaction were defined
in terms of Factor of Safety against Liquefaction
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straightforward means of estimating what the probability
distribution of the residual strength might be. Laboratory
measurements, based on post-cyclic monotonic loading is not
particularly satisfactory as the results are ‘point data’ that tend
to be on the high side. Empirical data can bemused as a basis,
but this too is not particularly satisfactory owing to differences
between existing empirical relationships. The issue is further
complicated by the fact that the material in the dam and
foundation is gravelly.
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The more refined 2-dimensional finite element FLUSH
analysis also utihsed the kequency domain analysis method, a
non-linear strain dependent stress-strain relationship, and the
‘equivalent linear analysis’ technique.
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The phased approach to the dam response analysis, beginning
with screening analyses and culminating in detailed finite
element deformation analysis, proved to be very successful.
However, it is important to recognise that there are enormous
differences in time and resource requirements between these
two approaches.
Procedure For Calculating The Probabilitv Of Failure
The procedure for calculating the probability of failure of the
dam recognised the uncertainties in the deterministic analyses
of the dynamic response as described in the previous section.
While the procedure described here is restricted to the seismic
hazard and the associated performance of the dam, this
account is structured to illustrate how the geotechnical
earthquake engineering component of the analysis was
interfaced with the dam breach and failure consequences
analyses. The essential features of dam failure mechanism
were modelled in event tree format where the term ‘event tree’
is used in its most general form.
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record of the water levels.
l

440

435

It is judged that when the water level
is below EL 430.0. the consequence
of overtopping
given failure is
negligible.

430

RSVR. WATER

LEVEL

The seismic hazard was introduced at the third and fourth
nodes in the tree

Event Tree - Life Safety

Probabilities

- Ground

For instance, the distribution of in-situ soil strength
(i.e. N-value) is a pre-earthquake state of nature and not an
‘event’ per se, as is the reservoir level at the time of the
earthquake.

Spectral

acceleration

Act.

(%g)
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Two-dimensional
analysis was carried out using two
earthquake records to obtain the acceleration response. While
spectral acceleration (S,) were used in the analysis, the
associated PGA values were used for labelling the amplitude
of the earthquake in the analysis for convenience.

Conditional

Probabilities
FOURIER

Magnitude Contributions

- Acceleration Response

AMPLIFICATION

FUNCTION

2D Analysis using 2 EQ Records
Typical Point within the Dumped Sand and Gravel
GILmY“1 EECORDF54=a2BG
-snu
wu)RD. pwio.leG

Time histories were scaled to the selected PGA; however, the
appropriate uniform hazard response spectrum, matched at the
1.5-second spectral ordinate, was used to derive the
probabilities.

Acceleration
Selected

6 Acceleration

the probabilities
Natural

are based

on

Time Histories

Scaling

intervals,

Factors

and

Probability

S,
Logarithmic

Scale

Scale
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The seismic hazard was characterised by six acceleration
levels, and for each acceleration level, the contributions Tom
different earthquakes were de-aggregated into six magnitude

intervals,

leading to thirty-six

combinations

PGA -

Magnitude

Probability

of Liquefaction

- Deterministic

pair

Triggering

The determination
of the
Probability
of Liquefaction,
P L,o, given the value of CSR is
based on the data compiled
by
Liao. Veneziano
and Whitman,
1988:
I

for input into the subsequent liquefaction

analysis.

pllc,= A1+-e-”
g=Bi+P2xln(CSRN)~P3x((N,),,)
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m

30

40

cN1)60

22

Paper No. SOAP - 5

-_--_-I

.-

I__

-.,.

--_f*j_-

-._.-..

._

.._-_

--b.

*,,,

Probability

Conditional Probabilities of the Liquefaction Maps

of Liquefaction

ZONES
P,,,

OF LIQUEFACTION

FOR DIFFERENT

PLY)>=0.50

=0.85

P-L@.

PLa3 =0.15
REPRESENTATIVE
PROBABILITY

[ (Ah

SPT W,),
Liao, Vmziano

and Witman,

1988) 1

Rather than using a single value of probability of liquefaction
(PLIQ) to determine the liquefaction resistance (CRR), three
different values were used. That is, for a given (N,)bo value,
there are three different CRR values, corresponding to
different confidence levels, that are used to determine the
liquefaction
zone.
For instance, for the case of
(Nl)60= 10 blows& CRR values of 0.11, 0.14 and 0.18
correspond to 15%, 50% and 85% probability. These three
values of probability of liquefaction, together with the thirty
six PGA-Magnitude pairs (6 sets of CSR’s x 6 magnitude
correction factor intervals and 3 associated values of PLIo)
resulted in a total of 108 liquefaction cases to be considered.
In other words, there were 108 end branches at the
liquefaction node of the event tree. To make the analysis
tractable, the 108 liquefaction states were reduced to six
representative “liquefaction states”.

Realization of Liquefaction Resistance from P,,,
IO

+obabilistic

Description

Representative

of Liquefaction

Liquefaction

Zones

Zone Maps

CSR

The next stage of the analysis was to determine the probability
distribution of crest slumping given the liquefied state (as
described by one of the representative maps),. The range of
crest slumping was divided into increments; Om, O.lm, OSm,
lSm, 3m, 5 m and >5m. The steps in the process were as
follows:
Paper No. SOAP - 5
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1.

3.

Using the ‘gravity turn-on’ finite element method, the
magnitude of crest slumping (Dcr) for a given
liquefaction map was calculated, with an appropriate
range of values for the strength and stress-strain
parameters, s, and Ylimselected to reflect the uncertainty of
these parameters in the probabilistic analysis.
Using a subjective transformation of the computed crest
slumping to predicted actual crest slumping, the
conditional probability of the crest slumping falling
within one of the intervals mentioned above was
estimated.
Steps 1 and 2 were repeated for each combination of s,

4.

Step 3 was repeated for each liquefaction zone map.

2.
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failure analyses being the ‘other side’ or the risk equation is
not presented in this paper. Both components, however, are
required to advance from the engineering analysis to the wider
policy/societal risk evaluation and assessment processes.

Slumping

THE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS
OF THE
ACTUAL TO COMPUTED CREST SLUMPING

Finally, damage states for the range of original
were defined to link the dam breach with
consequences component of the analysis (not
The damage states ranged from ‘No Damage’
Release’.

reservoir levels
the inundation
described here).
through ‘Rapid

Defining Damage States for Different Water Levels

1Definition

1

Probability of Damage
for different states.

Subjective

Conditional

Probability

of Crest

I

Slumping

- Rpd Rel. IS Rapid Rele ase.
and Dly Rel. is Delayed
I Release of Reservoir
* Water Level is 440 M

The analysis of the probability of failure of the Keenleyside
Earthtill Dam due to seismically induced liquefaction has been
subjected to extensive independent peer review by recognised
experts in all of the required engineering disciplines. This
peer review is necessary to establish the validity of the
analytical procedure used to compute the probability of
failure. Here it is important to note that, even this extensive
analytical estimate of the risk is incomplete as a formal
analysis of the uncertainties in the estimate of risk has yet to
be carried out. However, the procedures to perform this
uncertainty analysis are known and are essentially of the form
used in the probabilistic seismic hazard analysis. However,
this does not detract from the analysis that has been completed
thus far, as it was sufficiently complete to permit BC Hydro to
advance to the next stage of the dam safety decision-making
process.
The entire analysis and assessment process is presently being
documented. Therefore, it would be inappropriate for anyone
to reach any conclusions concerning the underlying
philosophy, the level of effort and resource requirements and
the status of the analytical procedures for use in dam safety
practice in general. This said, the geotechnical earthquakeengineering component of the analysis used to estimate the
probability of failure, with the exception of the uncertainty
analysis, has become established as a scientifically valid
engineering procedure through the recognised professional
and learned procedures.
Professor A. Casagrande, who introduced the concept of risk
analysis for dams, was the consultant for the original design of
Keenleyside Dam. Professor R.V. Whitman, who extended
the work of Professor Casagrande and developed the
procedure for analysing the probability of failure, provided
participatory peer review for the Keenleyside Dam Risk
analysis, along with Professor C.A. Cornell and Professor
N.C. Lind. Professor P.M. Byrne, Dr. W. F. Marcusson III and
Professor R.B. Seed provided subject matter expertise in the
various aspects of the analysis of the performance of the dam.
Together with the BC Hydro team members, Casagrande’s
vision of the future was successfully created, for one of his
own designs. This ‘giant step’ forward was made during the
Watershed Years from 1995 to 1998, and it provides a basis
for further advances in risk analysis for dams, especially in the
field of geotechnical earthquake engineering.

RECENT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES
QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS
CREST SLUMPING

Here ends the geotechnical earthquake-engineering component
of the Keenleyside Dam Risk Analysis. The consequences of
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IN DETAILED

A review of the literature quickly reveals that, for the most
part approaches to risk analysis range from applications which
involve little de-composition
and rely extensively on
‘judgmental’ probabilities. The ‘watershed period’ represents
an important stage in the development of risk analysis in dam
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safety practice. It can be traced back to the first serious
attempts to use risk analysis to decide ifa dam is safe enough
when the issues of scientific validity and legal defensibility
came to the fore in international practice. The following two
examples presented in this paper, the Hume Dam case study
and the second a procedure proposed by Lin and Hung (Lin
and Hung, 1999) for non-liquefaction seismic risk analysis,
serve to illustrate the form and status of ‘post watershed’ risk
analysis for dams.

From the perspective of geotechnical earthquake engineering,
the study represents a significant advance in Australian
practice as it was the first time that the effects of earthquake
magnitude were considered in a risk analysis in that country
(McDonald and Wan, 1998). The account does refer to
protocols for assigning probabilities (these are not presented
here) but the validity (in an absolute sense) remains to be
demonstrated. This is an issue for debate in the profession,
something which has not received adequate attention thus far.

Professor H.B. Seed observed that embankment dams may fail
because of excessive settlement and deformation, or due to a
significant build-up of pore water pressure, or as a result of
sliding of embankment slopes (Seed, 1979). This raised the
question as to whether or not the ‘settlement’ and
‘deformation’, and/or the embankment slope sliding failure
modes could be. Information on the seismic component of the
Hume Dam risk analysis, which focuses on liquefaction, is
presented to illustrate some of the many issues that must be
considered by the analysis team. The dam response analysis
procedure is not presented, but was similar to an earlier, but
unsatisfactory iteration of the Keenleyside risk analysis. The
work of Lin and Hung, (Lin et al. 1999) suggests that, in
principle, it might be possible, to assess the risk for
embankment slope sliding at any rate. Interestingly, the
groundwork for this analysis was developed in the 1980’s and
involved some of those working in this field at that time.
There are significant parallels between the proposal of Lin and
Hung and the Keenleyside Dam risk analysis. This is due in
part because they both rely on the pioneering work carried out
at MIT during the 1980’s.

The approach used at Hume Dam included consideration of

The question of ‘equivalence’ of methods and decisions made
on the basis of the risk analyses that present different various
level of analytical detail (essentially none through to
mathematically and scientifically rigorous) is one of the most
difficult questions requiring resolution at this time.

HUME
DAM RISK ANALYSIS
COMPONENT FOR THE EARTH DAM

SEISMIC

RISK

The Hume Dam risk analysis represents one of the most
ambitious attempts to perform a comprehensive risk analysis
of a large dam comprising earth and concrete structures for all
failure modes. The sheer breadth and complexity of the
problem to be analysed are such that an in-depth analysis of
the risk could not be carried out. This brief summary, based
on McDonald and Wan, 1998 and McDonald, Cooper and
Wan, 2000 (which in no way could ever reflect the enormous
amount of work involved) outlines some of the complexities in
the analytical procedures that should be accounted for in a
seismic risk analysis. The Hume Dam risk analysis does not
constitute an alternative to the Keenleyside Dam risk analysis
as it does not include the vitally important deformation
analysis, and it includes procedures subsequently found to be
unsuitable to the task of quantifying risk. However, it is
worthy of recognition because it led to the conclusion
concerning inadequacy of analytical procedures for ‘signing
off on the safety status of dams.
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five dams, three training walls and a system of 29 spillway
gates,
8 1 failure modes,
up to 32 branches in event trees,
8 flood loading states,
48 earthquake loading scenarios, and
6 prior storage levels.
This resulted in a requirement to assign and keep track of
some 15,000 conditional probabilities. It was felt that without
a systematic approach, analysts and reviewers could become
confused in attempting to assess such a large number of
figures. It was also recognised that there was a need to
maintain logical consistency throughout the analysis. Double
counting also had to be avoided. It was considered that the
most practical approach for handling the large number of
probabilities was to enter them onto spreadsheets, and to use
the event trees simply to illustrate the logic of the failure
process. Whilst the spreadsheets reduce the computation load
and avoid arithmetic errors, there was no practical way of
assessing logical consistency and checking against double
counting. The solution that was adopted for the Hume study
was the concept of the “Probability Assignment Protocol”.
This was a concise instruction for assigning probabilities as a
hmction of loading condition.
The obvious requirement to write down the reasons for
assigning probabilities (see BC Hydro, 1993) was found by
the analysis team to clarify their thinking and was extremely
beneficial to the analysis. It also provided a permanent record
of the rationale, which allows those not associated with the
study to understand the basis for the probability values. The
analysis team went as far as to recommend “that such
documentation should be regarded as mandatory for a risk
assessment study”.
The analysis team also felt that
documentation of sound reasoning would be an aid to legal

defensibility,

especially where review panels might pass

judgement on the reasoning.

Seismic response considerations and analysis method
The procedure of Liao and Whitman was followed for the
Hume risk assessment study. The Hume embankments were
not susceptible to liquefaction but the alluvial soils of the
foundation were. However, spatial considerations were
considered to be important, as the analysis was based on
information gained horn drill holes that had been put down at
various sections along the length of the embankments. This
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issue poses several interesting philosophical questions about
the meaning of ‘probability of failure’ for long linear
While these issues remain to be resolved, the
structures.
account of how it was examined in the Hume Dam risk
analysis is summarised here because it illustrates a way of
thinking, and it was the fust time that the matter had been
addressed in contemporary practice.
The matter was
considered during the Keenleyside Dam analysis, but not
followed through for various reasons (Keenleyside Dam is not
as long, and there are other unique features that made it
appropriate to consider the dam in sections).
At regular depth intervals, SPT values had been obtained and
samples had been recovered for particle size analysis. A
spreadsheet was prepared, with fields for information such as
location, borehole number, depth, soil type (percent fines),
groundwater level and N value from the CPT and SPT tests.
Each row represented one test level in one borehole. There
was an entry for every test location over all of the
embankments. On another spreadsheet, every row of the test
data spreadsheet was run through the Liao et al regression
equations to find the probability of liquefaction for that test
location.
It was observed that the Liao et al. equations
yielded a probability of liquefaction for low magnitude events.
However, it was felt that, in reality, such events would not
cause liquefaction because the duration of shaking would be
too short and the number of stress reversals too few. It was
decided that this problem would be handled by setting the
probability of liquefaction to ‘zero’ for event magnitudes of
MS.0 or less. This initial stage was consistent with the
magnitude ‘cut-off approach followed for Keenleyside Dam.
The highest probability of liquefaction in a borehole was taken
as the representative probability for that location. At sections
where there were three boreholes, some interesting questions
arose:
1. What is the probability that liquefaction will occur at all
three boreholes; that is, over a sufficiently large area that
a large scale slide could occur?
2. Would liquefaction at only one borehole location give rise
to a threat to the dam?
3. What is the probability that the boreholes have found the
zone that is most susceptible to liquefaction?

probability becomes independent of the number of boreholes.
This thought process gave rise to a related question: “What is
the area to which the Liao et al probabilities apply?” The
complexity of these issues was clearly recognised by the
analysis team, and they deserve credit for putting their
approach forward for debate. For reasons of practicality, the
analysis team, in a refreshingly open comment remarked:
“‘For the Hume study, the simple approach (or perhaps the
easy way out) was taken by considering only the upper
bound. ”
Concerning the second question, the analysis team had the
following
thoughts:
‘At some sections, the highest
representative probability was sometimes a couple of orders
higher than the others. The answer to the question seemed to
relate to the location of the high probability borehole. If it was
under the downstream toe of the dam, it seemed quite
plausible that Iocalised liquefaction in that area could cause a
small-scale slide, which might still endanger the dam. If the
highest probability borehole was well upstream, toward the
dam crest, it seemed less likely that a slide would result from
local liquefaction in that area, although there obviously would
be some impact on the post-liquefaction Factor of Safe&, F. A
search process was undertaken to see what situations gave the
highest value for the product, probability of liquefaction times
probability of a post-liquefaction slide times probability of
dam failure, given the slide. In the case of Hume Dam, the
result was that liquefaction over the whole area represented
by the three boreholes was always the critical case. ”
Moving on to the third principal question above, which arose
from consideration of the previous two, it became clear that
the boreholes represent only a small sample from very large
areas that could be susceptible to liquefaction. For example, at
Hume Bank No. 1, there was an area some 600m long by
120m wide where liquefaction is an issue. Sixteen boreholes
had been sunk over the area in question. The analysis team
reasoned that it seemed plausible that there would be areas
with a higher probability of liquefaction than any of those
examined. They also observed that strength may drop to a
value below the static value but higher than residual undrained
strength, either because drainage relieves pore pressure during
shaking, or because too few cycles of shaking result in only a
partial increase in pore pressure.

Concerning question 1, it is reported that after considerable
reflection, it was concluded that the first question should be

It was reported that the probability that the residual undrained

addressed

strength

using

the uni-modal

bounds

theorem

described

as

follows:
The upper bound probability of liquefaction
occurring over the whole area is the lowest of the three
representative probabilities for each location, whereas the
lower bound probability would be the intersection of the
liquefaction events at each location. The lower bound would
be the product of the three representative probabilities and was
generally considered to be a vanishingly small value. The
next problem encountered when addressing this question
related to embankment length issues and concerned the fact
that the more boreholes that are available, the lower the lower
bound probability. The only possible conclusion is that the
probability of liquefaction at a borehole is a function of the
area represented by the borehole such that the lower bound
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would

be reached,

given

liquefaction,

was not

an

issue for Hume Dam, because the investigations revealed that

all of the liquefiable zones were capped by finer, relatively
impermeable sediments. The analysis team reasoned that there
would be no opportunity for drainage to relieve excess pore
pressures generated during, and immediately after, earthquake

shaking.

The analysts also reasoned that the conditional

probability of reaching residual undrained strength, given
liquefaction, was 1.0. This said, the analysts recognised that
this will not always be the case. Making use of the work of
Stark and Mesri as a basis for reasoning, they considered that
the real issue that they were dealing with was the lowest
strength reached, and the impact that that would have on the
probability of sliding. It was considered that, where drainage
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would occur, the lowest strength may be a value somewhere
between the static pre-earthquake strength and the residual
undrained strength. It was noted that no probabilistic treatment
of this issue could be found in the literature, but it was felt that
it could be a real issue in many cases.
It was felt that there was more than one reason that the lowest
strength reached during liquefaction could be intermediate
between the static value and the residual undrained value. One
was that there might only be a partial increase in pore pressure
because of insufficient duration of shaking (the consideration
of magnitude described in the Keenleyside Dam risk analysis
is included to address this issue). The analysts also expressed
the view that considering the post earthquake strength to be
either the static strength or the undrained residual strength is
simplistic and unrealistic. The analysts felt that these
considerations point to the need for a comprehensive
probabilistic treatment of strength reduction due to pore
pressure increase during earthquake shaking.
Because of the dramatic reduction in Factor of Safety, F, that
occurs it was felt reasonable to characterise the probability of
failure in terms of a liquefaction induced slope failure. For the
Hume study, the residual undrained strength was expressed as
an equivalent friction angle. This value varied between 4 and 9
degrees typically, based on the strength versus N value
relationship given by Stark and Mesri. The typical static F
values of 1.5 to 1.7 dropped to post-liquefaction values of 0.8
to 1.0. Reliability analysis, with standard deviation in F
estimated by FOSM, was used to produce similar system
response curves to those shown in Fig. II-l. In this case, the
liquefied horizontal foundation zones accounted for 84% of
the variance in F. The conditional probabilities of a slide,
given liquefaction, were typically high (0.02 to 0.9) because of
the low post-liquefaction F values.

SEISMICALLY
EMBANKMENT

INDUCED
SLIDING
FAILURE
DAMS (From Lin and Hung, 1999)

OF

The following is a summary of a more detailed treatment
provided by Dr. J-S Lin. The approach builds on Newmark’s
investigations (Newmark, 1965) which had shown that the
factor of safety of slopes of embankment dams drops
temporarily below one during earthquakes but, this does not
necessarily represent ‘failure’. As an earthquake shaking
reverses its direction, a sliding instability may come to a stop.
However, during a strong earthquake, a slope may undergo
many slide-stop cycles and cumulates movements in a stepwise fashion. Newmark concluded that it is the total
accumulation of movement that determines the stability of a
slope, not the factor of safety per se.
The approach begins with the concept of a ‘critical
acceleration, where a slope sliding is initiated if the ground
acceleration exceeds a critical acceleration, &. A, is defined
as the acceleration that reduces the slope factor of safety to
one by introducing an adverse inertia force. A, is obtained
through static slope stability analysis.

A /S-l
c

3.33

g

The mean and coefftcient of variation were determined using
conventional probabilistic techniques.
Other assumptions for the example were that:
.
The most critical slope was one extending 6om crest to
mid-height; and
.
The mean, E[FS], and coefftcient
of variation,
C.O.V.[FS], of the factor of safety FS, were 1.5 and 0.2
respectively.

1E+O

The resulting mean, E[&] and coefficient of variation
C.O.V.[&], of the critical acceleration, were 0.4 and O.lSg
respectively. Using a lognormal distribution, and simplifying
the distribution into four discrete points, the derived
distribution of A, was as shown in Table II-l.
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Embankments
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Analogous to the Keenleyside Dam Analysis, it was necessary
for Lin and Hung to introduce a failure criterion, and a similar
approach was adopted (based on suggestions by Legg et al
(1982) for seismic slope stability evaluation). In this study,
the risk associated with slope movement ‘D’ of D 220 cm,
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D 2 50 cm, D 2 1OOcm, D 2 1SOcm, D 2 200cm and D 2 300
cm are to be obtained.

Procedure
The basic Newmark procedure of
1. Identifying the sliding surface that has the smallest factor
of safety through conventional slope stability analysis;
2. Conducting nonlinear dynamic analysis of the earth dams
to obtain average response acceleration of the mass above
the critical sliding surface;
3. Using the average absolute response acceleration and the
critical acceleration, to calculate the slope movement, was
employed.
Nonlinear dynamic analysis of earth dams was carried out
using simple equivalent linear finite element programs, such
as QUAD-4 developed by Idriss et al, 1973.
For this
particular application, simple shear wedge models were found
to provide results compatible to those obtained from finite
elements. The simple shear wedge model employed modal
superposition in the dynamic analysis.
Considering a dam of 115 m high with an average shear wave
velocity of 300 m/s, the average absolute response of the mass
above a potential sliding surface extending from crest to midheight of the dam is computed. A sample calculation showing
the evolution of slope movement is depicted in Fig. 11-2.

in practice, this component of uncertainty can be accounted
for if adequate data were available.
To obtain the distribution of slope movement, P(D), Lin and
Hung propose that first estimates of the conditional
distribution P(DIPGA, M, 4) could be made by employing a
probabilistic sliding block model as in Lin and Whitman
(1984). This study also employed an ensemble of 30 rock site
records from the 1971 San Fernando earthquake. This
ensemble was considered a representative sampling of rock
site motions. Its average response spectrum compares well
with that derived by Seed et al. These records are further
scaled to various magnitudes using the process proposed by
Lin and Tyan (1986).
1. Under a set of 4, PGA and M, conditional mean and
variance of D were computed for 30 records.
2. Assuming the conditional distribution of D to be
lognormal, P(D>dojPGA,M,&,yr)
for various do were
computed.
3.

P(D>doJM, yr) was obtained by summing over the possible
variation of 4 and PGA at a given earthquake magnitude, i.e.,

4.

The total risk ,P(D>dolyr), was obtained by summing
contributions from all magnitudes,

P(D > do 1yr) = cP(D
5GroundAcceleitionPGA=0.3g
I
I

> do 1M,yr)P(M)

In the probabilistic sliding block model, slope movement is
expressed as a ftmction of 4, the duration of ground motion,
S, together with some response statistics. Specifically, the
statistics used are the root-mean-square, 0 , a bandwidth
measure, 6 , and the central frequency, fi, 6om the response
spectral density function. The lognormal distribution was
found to describe this conditional distribution well. The two
of the model,
the conditional
mean,
parameters
E[D

1PGA, A, ,G, a,6 ) and the coefficient

of variation,

CO V[ D 1PGA, A,, 0 , Sz,6 ) , were also computed.

E[D 1PGA,A,,o,i2,6)

=v;S

COV[DIPGA,A,,o,QS)=[0.38+0.62F(r)]-

fi
J-V:S

where,
0

5

10

Trmr (se<)

Fig. II-2 Evolution

ofslopemovement

y=x
under Earthquake

excitation
Treatment of the uncertainty in the dynamic properties of the
dam was not included in the study, but the authors’ noted that,
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To make use of Lin and Whitman’s model, the dynamic
analysis of the dam was carried out in frequency domain, and
spectral density functions
of the average response
accelerations are computed. Following the procedure outlined
above, the risk of slope movement exceeding various
thresholds are computed.
The final result reflecting the risk of various levels of damages
are as follows:

Table II-2 Results of the analysis
This final result can now be incorporated into an overall dam
risk assessment.

SIMPLIFIED

attributes have associated drawbacks as in the absence of a
mathematical structure anyone can say anything. There is
always the danger of the dubious notions that a probability is
what you believe it to be and everyone s probabilities are right
even if they are different, being invoked as the approach can
be applied quickly, cheaply and easily by anyone. Of course,
a defender of the method might argue that only those with
special qualities and experience in risk assessment for dams
can make these judgements.

APPROACHES

Simplified approaches to risk analysis of dams, such as the
risk-based decision methodology described previously in Part
I, model risk in a very coarse manner as illustrated in Fig. 11-3.

“’
Fig. 11-3. Simplified (coarse) ‘judgmental ’ risk analysis model
This ‘judgmental’
approach, which is essentially that
developed for the USBR’s risk-based decision analysis
methodology has value if the results are used in a relative
sense to prioritise dam safety improvements and to plan
investigations (SMEC, 1995, Watson et al., 1997).
Certainly, the simplified approach appears to have several
attractive attributes if speed, cost and simplicity are the
Unfortunately, these
driving principles of the analysis.
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Unfortunately, this ‘simplified’ and apparently ‘practical
approach’ is not as straightforward or practical as it appears, if
one abides by the rules of the exercise of judgement in
engineering and the principles of estimating probabilities.
One has to look no further than the Challenger Space Shuttle
accident to question the validity of engineer’s judgements of
probability and see how tragic the consequences should the
advice lead to a bad decision. ‘Judgmental probabilities’ are
more correctly termed ‘subjective probabilities ‘, where the
theory of subjective probability forms an entire branch of the
mathematics of probability.
It is erroneous to give any credence to the numbers or to
assume that the rank order is in some way mathematically or
scientifically valid.
The vigorous debate concerning the
validity of this approach and the meaning of the numbers
generated, which originated when the notion of ‘judgmental
probabilities’ first emerged in the early 1980’s, has intensified
in recent years. Recently, the debate has become more
complex and divisive with analytical approaches to estimating
risk being deemed by some to be ‘not practical’ or ‘too
expensive ’ for all but the wealthiest of owners. The idea of
risk analysis being ‘credible ‘, ‘defensible ’ and ‘transparent ’
has been attacked by some practitioners, and the idea of risk
analysis being carried out in terms of certain standards and
norms denounced.
Objective (empirical frequency) probabilities and subjective
probabilities, are not the same types of probability.
The
simplest way of obtaining objective probabilities is to perform
repeated trials whereas the simplest method of obtaining a
subjective probability is to simply ask the person what their
‘degree of belief is. After all “a subjective probability is ‘just
someone’s opinion ” (Cooke, 199 1). However, Cooke pointed
out while this might be the simplest way of obtaining a
subjective probability, it is equally surely the worst. The
challenge was, and still is, to ensure that the probabilistic
statement of opinion is well founded. The apparently practical
‘empirical/judgmental ’ approach to probability estimation was
clearly some kind of hybrid of two different concepts!
Fundamentally, quantitative risk assessment of the form that
was proposed requires an objective statement of the
probability of failure of individual dams for comparison with
‘objective’ criteria. The empirical record, which characterises
the properties of the population of dams can never be
indicative of the probability of failure of individual dams
(statistics don’t apply to individuals).
Also, ‘judgmental
probabilities ’ are ‘subjective’- they have no objective meaning
and only exist in the mind of the person making the estimate.
The hybrid as applied to individual dams cannot have an
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objective meaning as it is made up of two parts, neither of
which exist in the real world.
For subjective probabilities to be well founded, it is important
that those making the estimates have substantive (subject
matter) expertise and normative expertise (be well calibrated)
(Morgan and Hemion, 1990). They had to have basic training
in probabilistic reasoning (a notoriously difftcult discipline)
and to be familiar with the mathematics of probability. They
had to know how to transform evidence and experience into
coherent statements of probability. Finally, because of the
extent to which judgement pervades dam engineering, they
also had to be people of judgement.
If anything, given the extensive role of judgement in
engineering practice, the ‘judgmental’ quality should have
been the most readily available. Di Biagio and Hseg (1989)
provide a very eloquent account of where judgement comes
f?om, and this advice, together with the experience in
estimating subjective probabilities outlined above, provided an
insight into the make-up of project teams assigning
judgmentalprobabilities
’ of dam responses. Ideally, the team
should consist of
.
People of judgement;
.
People with theoretical knowledge, experimental
evidence, empirical experience and the ability to
integrate all elements of the exercise in a logical and
transparent manner.
l
Individuals with substantive expertise;
l
Subject matter experts in each of the physical
processes involved in the failure mechanism.
.
Who also have normative expertise; and
.
Are demonstrably well calibrated (have a good track
record in ‘guessing right’),
l
All team members are trained in probabilistic reasoning;
and
l
Have detailed knowledge of the dam under investigation,
its properties, its design and performance and its
vulnerabilities.
Clearly, there is an enormous difference between asking
someone to quantify their ‘opinion’ concerning the outcome of
an event concerning a dam and asking properly qualified
people of judgement (in the accepted engineering sense) to
transparently transform their knowledge, experience and
evidence into their ‘subjective probability’ of ‘the event’.
Obviously, this is not routine engineering and certainly not
‘commodity’ engineering.
The difficulties of making ‘judgements’ of probability (as
opposed to asking someone’s opinion) are manifestly obvious.
Such judgements of probability are very uncertain because the
data are scarce and difficult to relate to the case at hand (all
dams are unique). Moreover, it is debatable whether it is
really judgement that was being exercised, because those who
were making these estimates lacked a rational mechanical
model on which to base their beliefs. The dam safety analyst
must “estimate,” i.e. assign, probabilities subjectively in part,
often describing them as “engineering judgements”
of
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probabilities. Such guesses are used in lieu of probabilistic
estimates of ‘parameters’ and ‘states’ made by means of
observations and rational physical models. These guesses
contaminate risk analyses, degrading quality. In the absence
of realistic theories and mathematical structure, anyone could
say anything, and in accordance with some interpretations of
the theory of subjective probability, they would all be ‘right’!
The practicality of making judgements of probability
concerning the failure of dams clearly poses an enormous
challenge. Setting aside any complexities associated with the
mathematics, as they are numerous but essentially tractable if
appropriate expertise is brought to bear on the problem, the
most significant practical difftculties were found to be with the
exercise of judgement concerning the behaviour of dams at or
near failure.
The exercise of judgement in engineering practice requires an
adequate theoretical basis, validated by experiments and
observations. The role of theory in ‘engineering practice’ is
well established, and its importance has long been recognised
in dam engineering. Professor Terzaghi, a ‘practical’ engineer
‘par excellence’ was acutely aware of the need for adequate
theories and their role in practice. The advice provided by
Terzaghi concerning the role of theory in geotechnical
engineering practice and the role of rigorous and simplified
solutions is also applicable to the exercise of judgement in
estimating failure probabilities of dams.
According to Tet-zaghi, “the ability to obtain rigorous
solutions is not a prerequisite for success@ work in the field
of soil mechanics. For both the research man and the
practising engineer it is sufficient to know the general
procedure by means of which the rigorous solutions are
obtained. The rigorous solution of the problems should be left
to professional mathematicians. ” However, Terzaghi made it
perfectly clear that practice is based on theory and that
adequate theories are a necessary part of practical engineering
and the exercise of judgement in engineering practice.
Immediate observations include:
Estimating risks posed by dams requires adequate
analytical theories to provide a basis for developing
practical approaches to analysing risks,
The empirical record of dam failures and incidents can
not in itself provide an adequate basis for inferences
concerning failure risks in individual cases.
If ‘judgmental probabilities’
were to be genuinely
characterised as ‘judgements’,
in the established
engineering sense as opposed to quantified statements of
opinion, they would be based on analytically derived
predictions.
In other words, the apparent differences
between the ‘analytical probability ’ philosophy and the
‘judgmental probability’ philosophy cease to exist if
proponents of the yudgmental probabili@’ philosophy
adopt the established approach to exercising judgement in
engineering practice.
In the absence of adequate theories of dam failure mechanisms
on which to base judgements of probability, and given the

philosophical problems associated with mixing objective and
subjective probabilities, the ‘empirical/judgmental’ approach
to estimating probabilities of dam failure becomes an
intellectual and philosophical failure. Thus, while it was clear
that it might always be possible to make a subjective estimate
of dam failure probability, this subjective estimate is no more
a property of the dam than the betting odds on a horse are a
property of the horse!
Owner’s might find these ‘simplified de-compositional
degree-of-belief
of benefit in an overall decision-making
process provided that they do not consider the risk numbers as
having any objective meaning. Subjective estimates of dam
failure probability cannot be compared with objective criteria.

SIMPLIFIED

DE-COMPOSITIONAL

I have taken the step of presenting this list in this way to
provide a clear warning against the application of the
procedures outlined in these ‘experiments’ in dam safety
practice. This said, these ‘experiments’ were immensely
valuable in revealing the difficulties
of performing
quantitative risk analysis for different types of dams for a wide
range of failure modes.

APPROACHES

As described in Part I, BC Hydro embarked on an extensive
investigation into the use of the ‘de-compositional’ event tree
approach in the early 1990’s in the interests of having
sufficient experience in applying the method to a wide range
of situations encountered in dam safety practice. In 1993, BC
Hydro published its risk-based dam safety guidelines in
interim form. Importantly, the procedures section was not
developed but an illustrative example application of the
simplified de-compositional process to BC Hydro’s Alouette
Dam was presented.
Initially, it appeared that the approach was feasible and the
results of the studies were presented at various dam safety
conferences to promote discussion. Oddly, apart from isolated
situations, the expected barrage of objections did not
materialise - had we succeeded? or, were we being ignored?
Recognising well founded concerns from within BC Hydro
and mindful that there were few opportunities for review and
critique by knowledgeable peers, and in response to serious
difficulties that were encountered during individual studies,
BC Hydro embarked on its own critique of its work.
The most significant concerns from within the project team
responsible for the developmental work were that the
estimates of dam failure probability were artefacts of the event
tree model and the subjective ‘degree-of-belief of the analysis
team. It was all achieved in the absence of robust theories and
analytical models, experimental evidence and empirical
experience. In fact, the simplified de-compositional approach
suffers from essentially the same drawbacks as the simplified
‘judgmental’ approach although it is less open to ridicule. The
interpretation of the theory of subjective probability and the
Kent Charts used to transform degrees of belief to numerical
statements of probability do not overcome the difftculties in
performing a de-compositional analysis. Anything short of
total de-composition of the failure mechanism into its
fundamental components means that the estimate of risk is an
artefact of the event tree model and the mind of the analyst.
By 1995, BC Hydro had abandoned the ‘Kent Chart’ approach
to assigning ‘degree-of-belief probabilities.
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This does not mean that these studies were of no value, as they
have potential to assist in planning further investigations and
in the prioritisation of dam safety improvements. The studies
in question relate to the dams listed in Table 114. However,
they fell short of the objective of risk assessment; that is,
determining ifthe dam is safe enough.

Table II- 4. BC Hydro dams where the simplified decompositional seismic risk analysis was not adequate for
formal risk assessment.
The outcome of this unprecedented investigation program was
that, while certain, but by no means all, failure modes
associated with extreme floods and earthquakes were
amenable in principle to quantification, static failure modes,
such as internal erosion, are not. This does not mean that it is
not possible to make subjective estimates of probabilities of
failure for all possible failure modes, , if only a quantified
statement of opinion is adequate. However, such quantified
statements of opinion are no more than a number that resides
in the head of the estimator, which, if not generated through
valid procedures, are nothing more than ‘guesses’.
The failure of these ‘experimental’ studies to produce the
desired result was actually a benefit in disguise as the
experience gained led to the development of BC Hydro’s riskbased dam safety prioritisation system (Hartford and Stewart,
1998) Further, and very importantly it led to a complete
review of BC Hydro’s dam safety management philosophy.
The result was that BC Hydro has moved beyond the simple
concept of estimating dam risks and comparing them with
numerical criteria (expected value, f-N and F-N curves etc.) to
determine if a dam is safe enough. We subsequently found
that our re-aligned philosophy as entirely consistent with the
position of the UK Health and Safety Executive, which is
arguably one of the most experienced and advanced ‘risk
regulators’ in the world.

32

THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY
None of the above should be interpreted as implying that the
theory of subjective probability does not have a place in risk
analysis for dam safety; it does. In fact, the formal theory of
subjective theory as applied through the careful use of Bayes’
Theorem is central to the success of risk analysis in dam safety
practice. However, in the vast majority of examples cited in
the literature, Bayes’ Theorem is remarkably absent.
Application of Bayes’ Theorem is essential for the subjective
probability to be credible and defensible, as Bayes’ Theorem
provides the necessary mathematical structure to ensure
robustness. However, one view in dam safety holds that the
formal application of Bayes’ Theorem should not be conJitsed
with the “‘Bayesian” probability approach, as degree-of belief
interpretations are sometimes called. This terminology results
from the idea embodied in Bayes’ Theorem that probability
varies according to the information available, but does not
necessarily impIy formal application of the theorem itself
(Vi& 1999). The validity of this view has yet to be broadly
accepted and appears to be contrary to the view expressed by
experts in the field of Bayesian probability (Cooke, 1991.)
Morgan and Henrion, 1990., Pat&Cornell, 1996, Kaplan,
1997).
Resolution of this issue rests with experts in
probability
and scientific inference, with appropriate
involvement of knowledgeable engineers to ensure that the
practical considerations are not lost in esoteric theory.
However, until it is resolved, owners must recognise that it is
an important issue that requires resolution and must take
whatever steps are necessary to avoid any difficulties
associated with it. Until the former view is ‘validated’ by the

wider mathematical and scientific communities, and to
proceed in a defensible manner, applications of ‘subjective’
probability
should be carried out within the formal
mathematical framework of Bayesian probability.

SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY

There are increasing demands for risk assessment to be
scientifically based. Miss J. Bacon, the Director General of
the UK Health and Safety Executive gave what I believe to be
sound advice, the task of the risk regulator - and of the
scientiJic and engineering communities - is to reassert the
concepts ofjustified risk and of ‘safe enough ‘; to demonstrate
the effectiveness of good science and technology in providing
robust systems of risk management and control; and to make
transparent the process undertaken for arriving at scientific
judgements and engineering decisions.
In the same paper, Miss Bacon noted “20 years ago an
eminent engineer in the UK suggested that: Engineering is
the art of moulding materials that we do not wholly
understand into shapes we cannot precisely analyse, so as to
withstand forces we cannot really assess, in such a way that
the community at large has no reason to suspect the extent of
our ignorance. ” This was accompanied by a clear warning by
this risk regulator: ‘I [J. Bacon] am afraid that 20 years on,
such black box mysticism in dealing with sources of risk is no
longer viable. The credibity of risk prevention and control is
at stake. ”

Fig. II-4 Event Tree Analysis using specialist opinion method of probability
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AND TRANSPARENCY

estimation

Here it is vitally important not to confuse ‘scientific validity’
(application of the scientific method) with ‘scientific proof as
they are distinctly different concepts. Many real life decisions
must be addressed before the scientific community can reach a
consensus, and this applies to dam safety decisions which are
fraught with uncertainty. What it does mean is that even
under conditions of great uncertainty, the principles of
scientific inference can be applied.
The following basic principles, which were formulated as part
of a research project into models for expert opinion elicitation
carried out under the auspices of the Dutch Government
(Cooke, 1991.) are also of value in risk analysis for dam
safety. These principles are:
Reproducibility: It must be possible for scientiJic peers to
review and if necessary reproduce all calculations.
This
entails that the calculation models must be filly specljied and
the ingredient data must be made available.
The source of the expert subjective
Accountability:
probabilities must be identified (this is particularly true for
decision-making concerning the safety of the public).
Empirical Control: Expert probability estimates must in
principle be susceptible to empirical control.
Neutrality: The method for combining expert opinion should
encourage experts to state their true opinions.
Fairness: All experts are treated equally. prior to processing
the results of observations.
One challenge faced by proponents of risk assessment for
dams is to demonstrate how these perfectly reasonable
principles are applied in their practices. In my view, and from
an analytical perspective, these principles are particularly
important as they relate to the fundamental process of
Scientific
estimating probabilities and probable states.
theories can never be conclusively verified, but, if a theory is
in fact false, then in principle it should be possible to conduct
a reproducible experiment to demonstrate that this is the case.
This process is fundamental to empirical control - it is the
safeguard against the argument that everybody’s subjective
probabilities are equally valid.
The use of subjective
probability does not permit the ‘expert’ to say whatever he/she
wants, and adherence to these principles ensures that the
analysis cannot be corrupted by institutional pressures and/or
motivational biases.
Consequently,

there

is a clear

need

for

studies

to demonstrate

that there is detailed analysis behind the numbers in event
trees. For example as in figure II-4 (Von Thun, 1996).
This does not mean that the numbers in this example are not
based on detailed engineering analysis; rather there is a need
to demonstrate that they are. ‘Rolling back’ a long complex
event tree to illustrate results in a simple easily understandable
form is a straightforward matter, as illustrated for Keenleyside
Dam.
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Therefore, the numbers in the simplified event tree in Fig. II-4
should be supported by analysis of the type illustrated for
Keenleyside Dam, and the proposed procedure of Lin and
Hung. This should not be misinterpreted as opposition to
practical approaches, rather as reminding ourselves of the
process which ultimately leads to practical engineering
solutions to complex problems.
The philosophy is quite
simple and reflects the basic principles of engineering
practice:
1. Develop a clear understanding
of the problem,
recoguising that real world problems are generally too
complex to be amenable to precise description or exact
solution.
2. Radically idealise the problem to make it amenable to
analysis by modelling the essential features and deemphasising the less essential (this requires skill at
modelling situations that are often beyond anyone’s
experience).
3. Develop a rigorous theoretical solution to the radically
simplified model of reality.
4. Make further approximations to the model and the
solution to create the ‘practical solution’, which can be
applied in practice, recognising that the rigorous
theoretical solution to the idealisation of the real problem
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is necessary to ‘calibrate’
solution

the approximate

‘practical’

Unfortunately, for commercial and other reasons, including
shifts in funding of learned endeavours, this established fourstep process has, for the most part not been carried out in the
evolution of risk analysis in dam safety practice. Rather, the
‘empirical/judgmental’ approach has been put forward as the
‘practical’ approach, even though they are generally devoid of
the necessary theories and mathematical
solutions.
Regrettably, the ‘empirical/judgmental’
approach to risk
estimation is now being staunchly defended, in the same way
as clinical experience, which is also devoid of necessary
theories and validated experimental results, is defended by
clinicians.
Meeting requirements for scientific validity and transparency
should not pose any difficulties in principle as the concept of
dams being designed in terms of scientific principles was
introduced over one hundred and thirty years ago. However, it
might present enormous difftculties in practice at this time.
Importantly, meeting requirements for scientific validity and
transparency strengthens the role of judgement in risk-based
dam safety decision making as it dispels any notions of ‘blackbox mysticism’ or ‘junk science’.
Most importantly, scientific validity and transparency provides
owners, regulators and the public with a basis for having
confidence in dam safety decisions based on the results of a
risk analysis, something that does not exist at present. Here, I
am putting forward the view that scientific validity and
transparency of analytical procedures is essential for the
acceptance of risk analysis as a legitimate means of informing
the dam safety decision-making process.

many which have been previously ‘debunked’ and others that
can be classed as ‘recycled and wrong’. This introduces a new
problem which owners need to be aware of if they rely on the
literature and/or those who write on the subject. There is a
clear need to improve the quality of the literature and to raise
the level of debate concerning risk analysis of dams and to
continually improve professional practice to ensure that
Professor De Mello’s concern (De Mello, 2000) about pseudoprofessional analysing of risks (Professor De Mello is not
alone in holding this view) is consigned to the history books.
If these vitally important issues are not addressed, scepticism
and lack of confidence in risk analysis in dam safety practice
will become even more entrenched.
Judgement has a vitally important role in the risk analysis
process. However, greater openness and clarity about how
judgements are exercised is increasingly being expected by
those affected by decisions, in return for their trust and
confidence. A great deal of work still needs to be done to
explain how judgements in analysing risks posed by dams are
exercised. It is no longer acceptable to present risk estimates
and associated decisions as ‘matters of judgement’ without
further explanation, still less to cloud them in the pretence of
being matters of fact. Increasingly, there is a requirement to
demonstrate that the exercise of judgement complies with
defined procedures to ensure robustness and tractability. This
will not be easy and will challenge jealously guarded
This challenge applies to proponents of
professionalism.
deterministic approaches to dam safety as well as proponents
of the risk analysis approach. Specifically, it applies to those
who favour the empiricaVjudgmenta1 and/or the ‘degree-ofbelief approach to estimating probabilities of dam failures.

That risk analysis in dam safety practice is controversial
should not come as a surprise as it involves the mathematics of
probability. Unfortunately, the modem literature on risk
analysis for dams is decidedly unhelpful in dealing with this
controversy as two opposite views, together with all possible
views in between these two extremes, are frequently
presented.
At one extreme, there is the view that

I hope that the reasons why I have concluded that judgement
should be based on the knowledge that is revealed by an
appropriate amount of analysis are understood because,
unfortunately, they are often misinterpreted.
I remain
confident that provided we work in terms of accepted
scientific principles, it will be possible to establish the
scientific basis for risk assessment in dam safety. Of course
this does not mean that we have to ‘prove everything
scientifically’ along the way; real life decisions usually can’t
wait for the scientists to ‘figure it all out’ and come to a
‘consensus’.
Rather we must employ the established
principles of the ‘scientific method’ and ensure that our

“methodologies

‘estimation

CONCLUSIONS

for

estimating

the

chance

of

dam

failure

are

procedures’

don’t

violate

any

of

the

laws

of

poorly developed and, at the present time, do not provide a

physics, or the principles of probability theoryand scientific

defensible basis for the conclusive sign off on the safety status
of a dam”.
At the other extreme, there is the view that
“methods are available for estimating the probability of failure
of dams for use in quantitative risk assessment for all failure
modes”.
Such are the differences of opinion between

inference.

proponents of risk assessment for dams in the same country!
The controversy is not restricted to the probabilistic
component of the analysis, as dam failure mechanisms are not
well understood and generally difficult to model.
Regrettably, the modem literature on quantitative risk
assessment for dams is increasingly suspect as there is clear
evidence that it is being contaminated by re-cycled ideas,
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Failure to meet the expectations of scientific validity and
transparency in an increasingly sophisticated society could
well mean that we will not, i) overcome the growing mistrust
by the public of advice given by scientists and risk calculators,
and ii) earn the trust of the engineering and scientific
communities, regulators and, most importantly, the public
whose consent to own and operate dams is one of our most
valuable assets.
Presently, from an owner’s perspective, and in the light of my
background research as summarised in this lecture, I have no
36

option but to conclude that, for the most part, “methodologies
for estimating the chance of dam failure are poorly developed
and, at the present time, do not provide a defensible basis for
the conclusive sign off on the safety status of a dam. In fact I
go further and advise that at present, and for the purpose of
legally defensible quantitative risk assessment, risks posed by
dams can only be estimated in a scientifically valid way for a
small number of failure modes, and only where the failure
initiating event can be characterised probabilistically in a
mathematically correct way.

Bartlett, S.F. and T.L. Youd. [1992]. Empirical Analysis of
Horizontal Ground Displacement Generated by LiquefactionInduced Lateral Sptreads. Technical Report NCEER-92-002 1,
August 17.

This said, I have also concluded that the future for quantitative
risk analysis and its use in dam risk management is decidedly
bright, provided the appropriate resources are brought to bear
on the problem of analysing dam risks. There are solid reasons
to believe that risk analysis procedures for other modes of dam
failure can be achieved if research and development efforts are
carefully chosen, planned and implemented.
It should not
come as a surprise that a great deal of research and
development into failure modes, mechanisms and their
probabilistic description, is required. However, there is no
option other than to address these challenges as uncertainty
pervades all aspects of dam engineering. The Keenleyside
Dam risk analysis is an example of what can be done and
demonstrates at least in principle that scientifically valid and
defensible risk analysis for dams can now be achieved under
certain circumstances. Great strides have been made in the
understanding of the fundamentals of risk analysis for dams
during the past thirty- five years, and especially during the
past three years. 1997 was a ‘watershed’ year in risk analysis
in dam safety.

Bowles, D.S. [ 19891. Risk Assessment in Dam Safety
Decisionmaking.
Risk-Based Decision-Making
in Water
Resources IV. Y. Haimes and E. Stakhiv (Eds.). ASCE, pp.
254 - 283.

This State-of-the-Art and Practice lecture has provided me
with the opportunity to set out a strategy for achieving
scientifically valid, legally defensible estimates of risks posed
by dams. I hope that the Canadian Electricity Association
(CEA) Dam Safety Interest Group project A Guide to Dam
Risk Management provides an organisational structure to
achieve this end. I have concluded that, provided we move
beyond the proposed practices of the 80’s and 90’s and
embrace the ideas of scientifically-based risk analysis in dam
safety, the future looks very bright indeed. I look forward to
being joined by others committed to managing dam risks on
the basis of scientifically valid and legally defensible risk
analyses, and to working with them to achieve this objective.

Casagrande, A. [1965]. Role of the “Calculated Risk” in
Earthwork and Foundation Engineering. J. Soil Mechanics
and Foundation Engineering Division. SM4. July.
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